

# THE TECHNICAL, THE PRACTICAL, AND THE EMANCIPATORY: A HABERMASIAN VIEW OF COMPOSITION PEDAGOGY

---

JOHN ABER

We need not listen very long to leading composition theorists to learn that our field is an expanding one. As David Bartholomae pointed out recently in a published version of his 1988 address to the CCCC convention, "We now produce more words than any single person can possibly read. We cannot be kept up with" (48). To expand as we have over the past two decades—or to emerge as Stephen North might say—our researchers have borrowed heavily from the ideas and techniques of other disciplines, not hesitating at all to use quantitative methodology of western psychology while also admitting that phenomenological methods rooted in the traditions of anthropology may sometimes be appropriate for studies of classroom writers. And for the past several years, our journals are as likely to be filled with articles about the sociology of knowledge as with essays about our rhetorical heritage. But of all the borrowing we have done, perhaps our use of European philosophy and psychoanalytic theory has gained the most prominence in recent years. I have not tallied precisely the number of references to them, but it is increasingly difficult to avoid the

names of Derrida or Lacan when thumbing through a copy of *Freshman English News*. And Michel Foucault's name is very likely to appear under Linda Flowers' as we scan the bibliographies in *College English*.

But one European's name remains missing from nearly all of our scholarly writing. I refer to the critical social theorist Jurgen Habermas. There is a chapter about him in a recent book by Sonja Foss entitled *Contemporary Perspectives in Rhetoric*, a source that I am indebted to for its useful bibliography. But for the most part, we have neglected to assimilate Haberman's thought into composition theory, a surprising omission considering his prominent stature in the European intellectual community.

Thomas McCarthy, his major translator, calls Habermas "the dominant figure on the intellectual scene in Germany today" (ix). Peter Wilby, writing in *New Society*, calls him "one of the intellectual giants of the century" (667). Eric Bredo and Walter Feinberg have stressed that Habermas is "the foremost representative of [European] critical theory" (272). In fact, most commentators agree that scarcely a word written about contemporary social theory has not been influenced by Habermas. Why, then, has he been largely ignored by compositionists—even those interested in formulating theories that attempt to begin to account for the social nature of composing?

Part of the difficulty may lie in the breadth of Habermas's scholarship. His densely written books are stuffed with an encyclopedic range of references and allusions. Many of us who studied rhetoric and composition in graduate school simply are not conversant with the nineteenth-century German philosophical tradition that underpins Habermas's work. And although many of us know the Frankfurt School flourished during the middle of this century under the guidance of Max Horkheimer, few of us in the United States have had access to the German texts of Hans Gadamer and Theodor Adorno—texts that have not been quickly translated, yet are often considered critical to an understanding of the Frankfurt School and of Habermasian thought. Finally, there is an inherent difficulty with Habermas's writing style itself. Whether he is read in German or in English translation, his prose is so convoluted and opaque that one of his critics was led to complain that reading Habermas is like reading an engineering textbook in Swahili (Wilby 669).

So despite Habermas's interest in speech act theory, universal pragmatics, and what he terms the systematically distorted nature of communication in Western technocracies, i.e., despite his interest in ideas directly related to rhetoric and communication, Habermas remains a largely unused resource in our field, referred to occasionally by those working in the field of speech but seldom directly cited by those interested in writing.

However, his influence, as I have already suggested, has been pervasive in all fields linked to the study of the human social condition. And some of his thought, in the form of basic premises, has surreptitiously seeped into the work of several scholars concerned with student writers whose social experience makes success in writing classrooms difficult. When Ira Shor discusses the struggles of his working class writing students in *Critical Teaching and Everyday Life*, what he begins to suggest is that the lives of these students have been culturally dominated by a kind of American corporate technocratic double-speak, distorted communication that in essence tells working-class youth to shut up and accept the status quo. Such a view echoes Habermas's notion that communication can serve a repressive function in our culture when it is limited—and legitimized—by the technical needs of our corporations and government (Bredo and Feinberg 273). When Patricia Bizzell questions whether we can ignore the personal and social elements in academic discourse and in our students' writing, she reflects Habermas's assertion that different realms of meaning need to be recognized as equally valid in all communities and that technico-discursive knowledge should not necessarily be thought of as superior to the practical knowledge we learn from one another in everyday interaction. And when James Berlin classifies current classroom rhetorical approaches into three basic categories—the cognitive, the expressionistic, and the social-epistemic—he is essentially employing a system that mirrors the one used by Habermas to categorize what he calls the cognitive interests of human knowledge. In fact, Berlin's categories seem to correspond directly to Habermas's notion of the way all knowledge is shaped and used: in technical ways for instrumental reasons, in practical ways for socio-cultural reasons, and in emancipatory ways for reasons that relate to dependency and power (Held 255). Habermas emphasizes how broadly he conceives these categories in this way:

Orientation toward technical control, toward mutual understanding in the conduct of life, and toward emancipation from

seemingly 'natural' constraint establish specific viewpoints from which we can apprehend reality as such in any way whatsoever. (*Knowledge and Human Interests* 311)

Habermas has obviously outlined for himself an ambitious agenda with this theory of knowledge and human interests, maintaining that it can be used to analyze all aspects of human endeavor. Habermas operates from the tradition of grand theory-making, much like his German predecessors from the 19th century.

Despite its breadth and complexity, this theory is worth focusing on. An explicit delineation of Habermas's basic premises may shed a little light on the contentiousness—and perhaps even confusion—that too often marks our discussions about what composition is, how it might be learned, and what it is actually good for.

At the core of Habermas's theory lies his idea of human cognitive interests. Although these interests ultimately spring from socio-political struggle, Habermas is careful to call them cognitive interests—for they define basic orientations and primary assumptions about what counts as knowledge in any given field. In other words, whenever he asks himself how knowledge is produced, Habermas begins with some basic questions: What interests are being served by this knowledge—who or what stands to benefit from it and why?

As David Held points out, Habermas begins to answer these questions by arguing “from an understanding of humans as both toolmaking and language-using animals” (255). This understanding leads him to define two of these interests in terms of what people require to produce their material existence through the control of objects and what they require to “communicate with others through the use of [commonly] understood symbols within the context of rule-grounded institutions” (Held 255). The words *produce*, *control*, and *communicate* are critical terms, for Habermas integrates them into a schema that describes two essential ways of knowing. The need for the production of objects and control over them spawns what Habermas calls the technical interest. It unfolds through the medium of work or what Habermas calls instrumental action. And it has given rise to the possibility of empirical-analytic science, a science that arranges knowledge in a never-ending series of facts, often accepted in an *a priori* fashion, which are then plugged into a hierarchical chain of deductive reasoning.

On another level, humankind's need for communication

spawns what Habermas calls the practical interest. It unfolds through the medium of interaction or language, and it has given rise to the possibility of what Habermas calls historical-hermeneutics, a way of interpreting the meaning systems of peoples and cultures. Its goal is to achieve understanding by making explicit the patterns of consensus and reciprocity that make human interaction possible. If the technical interest is concerned with the “how” (How can we grow more crops on the Great Plains? How can we get students to do what professional writers do?), then the practical interest is concerned with the “what” (What do the farmers think about national agricultural policy? What does our students’ experience contribute to the way they feel about writing?).

Habermas identifies a third interest, however, one that is just as valid and just as prevalent as the other two, if not more so. It lies in “the human capacity to be self-reflective and self-determining, to act rationally” (Held 255). Out of this capacity grows an ability to achieve “autonomy and responsibility” (Habermas *KHI* 314). Knowledge produced to attain this end resides in what Habermas calls the emancipatory interest. It unfolds through the medium of power or asymmetrical relations of constraint and dependency, and it gives rise to what many social theorists such as Richard Bernstein call the critical social sciences (193). As Habermas explains, these sciences of social action are geared toward discovering when knowledge governed by the technical and practical interests “express frozen . . . relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed” (*KHI* 310). In many ways, as Bernstein points out, the Socratic model of attaining self-knowledge through a process of dialogue is akin to what Habermas has in mind when he discusses how people can gain emancipatory knowledge. Participants in such dialogue can “achieve self-knowledge and self-reflection which are therapeutic and effect a cognitive, affective, and practical transformation . . . toward autonomy” (Bernstein 199).

But I use this Socratic example with some trepidation, for it presupposes an open public sphere that encourages debate and rational discussion, a public forum that Habermas contends does not exist in most contemporary cultures because of the primacy of the technical interest. “The nomological sciences,” Habermas states, lead to “the substitution of technology for enlightened action” (*KHI* 316). But even though the emancipatory interest often lies dormant in contemporary public life, Habermas maintains that

it is the one realm of knowledge with the capacity to question premises of the other two (*KHI* 314). Bernstein emphasizes this point in his commentary on Habermas: “Implicit in the knowledge guided by the technical and practical interests is the demand for . . . the conditions of emancipation, i.e., the ideal state of affairs in which nonalienating work and free interaction can be manifested” (198). If the technical interest asks *how*, and the practical interest asks *what*, the emancipatory interest asks *how* and *what* and *why*: How has this culture prevented, say, many student writers from fully and actively participating in the political life of our country? What historical and social constraints led them to accept this situation? And why haven’t they tried to change it?

Habermas’s theory can be applied in many ways to the study and practice of composing. When teachers want to discover *how* to prepare students to please teachers from other disciplines, they pinpoint features of academic discourse and reason in a deductive way so that these features can be reproduced by students if they follow a hierarchically arranged sequence of activities. In other words, at times writing teachers emphasize technical interest in an effort to control students as if they were tools to be shaped and molded for a pre-ordained kind of work. By the same token, most teachers realize that the practical interest must sometimes be primary, especially when they need to discover what socio-cultural patterns of meaning prevent students from being willing to practice what it is believed writers in the academy must do. In other words, at times teachers interpret students’ language and social interaction to arrive at the intersubjective norms that govern their behavior, not necessarily in an effort to control them, but simply to understand them and relate to them. Finally, teachers sometimes sense students are in college—and in writing classes—against their will. At that time, teachers often offer them a chance to reflect, to discuss and write about the conditions that led to these feelings of powerlessness in the face of an academic and economic system that can render them dependent on forces beyond their control. When teachers open their classrooms in this way, they begin to realize that the emancipatory interest is primary and that a student’s sense of autonomy and responsibility must be treated as paramount.

Habermas claims, and I would agree, that all three interests are required for success in human endeavor (*KHI* 256). In fact, I would assert that all three interests are required if we are to suc-

ceed as writers or as teachers of writers. What we should guard against is not the appearance of being atheoretical or eclectic through our use of all three interests. Instead, we need to avoid confusing one interest for another. Writing teachers do neither themselves nor their students any service by claiming to practice emancipatory teaching methods when they may be doing something entirely different. For instance, teaching students about traits of academic discourse is viewed by some writing teachers as a liberating act, one that enables students to attain a higher economic position than might otherwise be possible. But unless such instruction is coupled with a willingness to encourage students to critique the power relations that separate rich from poor, black from white, strong from weak, the teaching of academic discourse cannot be considered emancipatory at all, for it encourages passive acceptance of poverty and powerlessness as a condition to be escaped, instead of eradicated.

Of course, such confusion is understandable. We live in a culture that worships the technical interest, placing it in a position that used to be reserved for God and religion. As Paul Feyerabend so aptly puts it, "the excellence of science is assumed, not argued for . . . . Methods of discussion that were once treasures of theological rhetoric have now found a new home in science" (73). As a result, the powers of the empirical-analytical sciences are brought to bear on a whole range of social problems that may be better understood and solved in other ways. Habermas himself stresses this point in clear, direct language: "The empirical, analytical sciences produce technical recommendations, but they furnish no answer to practical questions" (*Theory & Practice* 254). For instance, we spend countless dollars developing drugs to manipulate and control the chemical processes that we think might cause mental illnesses such as depression, yet we spend relatively little to develop practical understandings of the estranged social relationships that may govern the meaning systems of depressed people. Furthermore, most medical insurers will not pay anything at all toward long-term psychoanalysis that might enable people to reflect openly on the nature of their depression and rationally act to transform it. As this example begins to illustrate, our culture regularly uses knowledge from the technical realm to solve problems that may at their root be problems of frozen social misunderstanding and, perhaps, most strikingly, problems of profound powerlessness.

What implications does such confusion have for those of us who work in the field of composition? For one thing, this confusion may go a long way toward explaining why proponents of Linda Flower's problem-solving approach to writing instruction cannot seem to talk very well with people like James Berlin and Ira Shor, who ground their work in a socio-cultural-political perspective. These two groups are perhaps simply working at cross purposes. Several other implications come to mind. For instance, we may not want to spend a large amount of class time on technical concerns in the hope that our arrangement of activities and exercises will prompt students to become socialized into the ways of the academy. As I have stressed, Habermas teaches us that technical knowledge may not address the problems of the practical interest. Writing teachers such as Anne Herrington and Marcia Curtis, whose classes are filled with working-class minority students, echo this view. In a recent article, they assert that a traditional composition curriculum, with its emphasis on technical concerns, often keeps students on the "fringes" of the academy, "marginalized academically and socially within the university" (489).

By the same token, we might not want to spend too much of our time prompting our students to be expressive about the nature of their lives in the hope that such expressiveness will prompt them to reflect about the power relations that prevent them from being autonomous. Again, Habermas teaches us that practical knowledge about everyday life may not address the problems of the emancipatory interest. The emancipatory educator Paulo Freire emphasizes this point when he states that as long as teachers ask students to "look at social reality . . . only to describe it, this education becomes as domesticating as any other" (125). If we take the emancipatory interest to be primary, as Habermas does, then we must open up our classrooms, open them so that they can become the public forums of reflection and rationality that are so often absent in our culture, open them to discussions about the nature of power in the academy, and, perhaps most importantly, open them to the possibility that both socially engendered patterns of meaning and technical rationality can be questioned.

Such goals, of course, are ambitious. Instead of trying to reach all of them at once, writing teachers might begin by simply using Habermas's theory of cognitive interests as a way of connecting their goals to their methods of instruction. And they could make



these connections by first listing all classroom activities they ask their students to engage in, in order to analyze to what extent, say, the emancipatory interest is being attended to in the life of a classroom. One writing teacher I know divides her syllabus into three sections that reflect her use of Habermasian theory. At the top of one section, she writes the words *Technical Matters*, and under this rubric, she clearly states that her mention of mechanics, usage, APA style, and so forth is geared toward asking students to accept the academic status quo. At the top of another section, she writes the words *Knowing About Writing*, and under this rubric, she details activities that might enable her students to make explicit attitudes and beliefs about writing that they, knowingly or not, have been operating under throughout their school careers. Her third section is labelled *Writing and Power*. Here, she states that her goal is to delve openly into the way certain groups of people such as landlords and lawyers use much of their writing to gain political and economic power over others.

Although Nancy Mack does not divide her syllabi into those three sections, she is another writing teacher who has begun to focus attention on realms of knowledge that correspond to the three Habermasian interests. For instance, she often asks her students to write about experiences with various kinds of writing assignments in their role as students. The resulting texts, which become narrative writing histories of actual student writers, can then be used to uncover practical understandings each student brings to the composition classroom. Mack herself has integrated some of these understandings into an essay that can be shared with a class and then discussed in connection with some critical questions: What beliefs does this class have about writing? Where did those beliefs come from? How do these beliefs compare to the actual practice of professional writers and to the beliefs of academicians who, either tacitly or explicitly, teach students how language is used and valued in various disciplines?

In "Cross-Curricular Underlife: A Collaborative Report on Ways with Academic Words," Susan Miller and several of her undergraduates from the University of Utah discuss how a group of student writers can devote an entire quarter to study of the practical interest as it relates to composition and language learning in a large research-oriented university. Miller and her students chose to study and write about cultures of many different classrooms and of several different disciplines in order to learn "how

students and teachers used language and valued specific language interactions across the curriculum” (11). Miller’s students concluded that ideas about language use stressed by writing teachers do not necessarily coincide with the way teachers from other disciplines ask students to use language. And this discovery then led the students, and Miller herself, to question the gatekeeping role composition courses now play in the life of their university. As Mack has done with her students, Miller has used writing and reflection to develop a classroom forum for inquiry into the patterns of social understanding—and misunderstanding—that can determine what students write and why they write it.

Once students begin to develop certain practical understandings through the use of writing, it can be a very short leap into the emancipatory realm. For instance, a writing assignment that asks students to describe their writing histories can easily go beyond mere description once students believe they have the right to open a dialogue with those who may have had control over classrooms in which that history was shaped and actually lived. Several semesters ago, a group of my freshman writing students wrote a letter to some of their high school English teachers not long after compiling their own writing histories. In that letter, students stated that they had begun to question many of the “English class rules” that used to govern how and what they wrote in high school. Among the rules they most strongly questioned were those that had prevented them from using *I* and *you* in their school papers. Why, my students wondered, were such seemingly harmless pronouns so strictly prohibited by most of the English teachers they had encountered during their secondary school careers? Two teachers who wrote back stressed that they had hoped to prepare high school English students for the rigors of college writing assignments. Even though they agreed that rules were often not as hard and fast as implied in their classrooms, both mentioned that high school students need to learn to sound objective and authoritative in their writing. One way to do that, they said, was to avoid the use of too many personal pronouns. After receiving the letter from her former teacher, one student said something that led me to believe she had begun to develop some autonomy and responsibility as a writing student: “My high school teacher felt she was being told what to do just as much as I did,” she said. “Maybe the only authority I need to look to is what makes sense for me and my readers, if I can pull it off.” The qualifica-

tion at the end of this sentence suggests that my student was still hesitant to accept what was for her a new-found freedom as a writer. But what she said also suggests that she was ready to abandon dependence on her teachers to tell her what she could and could not do in her writing. I would argue that breakthroughs such as these, no matter how small they might seem, are exactly what Habermas has in mind when he discusses the transformative, emancipatory power of dialogue as a force that can lead to an incisive critique of prevailing technical rationality.

Robert Young, a critical educator who has written extensively about Habermasian theory, makes clear a point to be emphasized whenever teachers decide to make their classrooms open forums for emancipatory dialogue. "It is not the function of critical educators to attack the life-world of students—to make trouble," Young writes. "Rather it should be to assist students to make an effective job of reconstructing the already problematic parts of that life-world" (71). In other words, college writing teachers cannot pounce on their students, telling them that all they learned in high school was nonsense. If I had done that with the students I have just referred to, I am certain they would have become defensive and never composed the letter to their high school teachers. Such caution may be even more important when dealing with issues that relate directly to the personal lives of students. For instance, students do not need to be told that their career goals reflect shallow, materialistic values or that their dating patterns display a firmly rooted belief in an outmoded, hierarchically structured sexist culture that needs to be radically transformed. If told such things, students would simply be angry—and more than a little disinclined to engage in any kind of classroom dialogue, emancipatory or otherwise. And who could blame them?

Teaching with the emancipatory interest in mind involves, as much as possible, an acceptance of views of students, no matter how wrongheaded those views might at first seem. For instance, the teacher whose divided syllabus reflected the three Habermasian interests discovered that one of her classes was interested in writing about relationships between men and women on campus. The teacher first asked a group of students to describe some familiar relationship patterns. She then asked them to observe interactions of men and women drinking and dancing at a campus bar. The descriptions that resulted were telling for the teacher. Her students described what they saw as manifestations of love and devotion,

whereas she saw recurring patterns of dependency and power, showing her that most of the women described had been objectified by the men they dated. But she did not tell her students the patterns she saw. Instead, she simply directed her students to ask some of the men they had observed what those men valued most in the women they dated. This questioning problematized for the students the descriptions they had written, for they began to see some contradictions between what the men said they valued and what they appeared to value when observed. At this point, the assignment, which had by now taken several weeks of the quarter, left the practical realm and entered the emancipatory. The final piece of writing was an open letter to some men involved in a date-rape workshop conducted by a residence hall director. In it, the women asked pointed questions about the value men on campus seemed to place on women who acted meek and submissive. Their teacher told me that the presentation of their letter was perhaps the first publicly assertive act that these students had ever performed.

Not all emancipatory teaching proves to be as successful as this example in helping students generate powerful pieces of writing that question the status quo and that begin to open up for them new ways of viewing their life experience. As many critics of emancipatory education correctly point out, students often have no desire to question the status quo and will continue to view writing as a technical instrument despite their teachers' best efforts to guide them in other directions. But writing teachers should not be discouraged by student resistance. In fact, rather than viewing such resistance as unhealthy, writing teachers can actually use it as a powerful teaching tool when asking students to reflect critically about what a writing class ought to accomplish. Moreover, analyzing student resistance to particular assignments and activities can give writing teachers wide ranging research opportunities as they attempt to discover what sorts of emancipatory knowledge students are ready to grapple with.

For teachers interested in developing appropriate life themes for students to explore critically, one fertile area of research can be pursued by asking one central question: What widely held cultural beliefs are students apt to be most skeptical of? A research question like this one may be explored in the classroom by asking students to agree or disagree with statements that contain certain unchallenged cultural assumptions. One teacher who tried this

technique learned that many of her students did not believe that learning how to write led to good grades or to high paying jobs, a belief they all agreed was widely held by their parents. Several semesters of collecting information could give writing teachers a good working knowledge of themes that might lead students to the kind of reflection Habermas believes is essential for producing emancipatory knowledge.

For teachers who have time to pursue a more systematic study of student beliefs and life themes, an anthropological approach might be appropriate. For instance, sitting in a colleague's class for several weeks to observe how students respond to a wide variety of writing activities could lead to a wonderfully rich ethnographic account of what life themes motivate students to use writing in an autonomous, assertive way. Of course, once such a descriptive, quotive account of classroom life has been written, it needs to be analyzed. And Habermas's theory of cognitive interests could then become a powerful framework for judging what kinds of knowledge produces what kinds of student texts. It would be intriguing to compare, say, the kind of writing produced by students who are responding to an assignment requiring technical mastery of a given rhetorical form to that of similar students who are using writing for social or critical purposes. In *Reading, Writing and Resistance*, Robert Everhart uses this kind of Habermasian analysis quite effectively to delve into the life of a junior high school English class. This analytical technique could certainly be applied to the high school or college classroom.

But no matter what our interests are as teacher-researchers, as writing teachers we have an obligation to reflect deeply about what we practice. My purpose in this essay has been to alert writing teachers to the potential usefulness of Habermas's theoretical framework as an aid to such reflection. There is no magic in it, of course. A teacher may know that writing can be used for emancipatory purposes, but that does not guarantee that anyone will become transformed into an autonomous, self-reflective writer, capable of forcefully addressing a wide range of audiences. Such transformations can only begin to occur when writing teachers put their handbooks, rhetorics, and readers aside for a while and attend to reading the world of their students. For we cannot expect our students to look at their world and reflect deeply about it if we are too busy with technical matters to do so ourselves.

## WORKS CITED

- Bartholomae, David. "Freshman English, Composition, and CCCC." *College Composition and Communication*, 40, No. 3 (February 1989): 38-49.
- Berlin, James. "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class." *College English*, 50, No. 5 (September 1988): 477-494.
- Bernstein, Richard. *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978.
- Bizzell, Patricia. "Foundationalism and Anti-Foundationalism in Composition Studies." *Pre/Text* 7 (Spring/Summer 1986): 37-56.
- Bredo, Eric and Walter Feinberg. "The Critical Approach to Social and Educational Research." In *Knowledge and Values in Social and Educational Research*. Ed. Bredo and Feinberg. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982, 271-291.
- Everhart, Robert B. *Reading, Writing and Resistance: Adolescence and Labor in a Junior High School*. Boston: RKP, 1983.
- Feyerabend, Paul. *Science in a Free Society*. London: Verso, 1978.
- Freire, Paulo. *The Politics of Education*. South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1985.
- Foss, Sonja K., Karen Foss and Robert Trapp. "Jurgen Habermas." In *Contemporary Perspectives in Rhetoric*. Ed. Foss, Foss and Trapp. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1985, 213-239.
- Habermas, Jurgen. *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Trans. Jeremy Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Theory and Practice*. Trans. John Viertel. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- Held, David. *Introduction to Critical Theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Herrington, Anne J., and Marcia Curtis. "Basic Writing: Moving the Voices on the Margin to the Center." *Harvard Educational Review*, 60, No. 4 (November 1990): 489-496.
- Mack, Nancy. "Myths." Unpublished paper. The Ohio State University, 1983.
- McCarthy, Thomas. *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978.
- Miller, Susan, Worth Anderson, Cynthia Best, and others. "Cross-Curricular Underlife: A Collaborative Report on Ways with Academic Words." *College Composition and Communication*, 41, No. 1 (February 1990): 11-36.
- Shor, Ira. *Critical Teaching and Everyday Life*. Boston: South End Press, 1980.
- Young, Robert. *A Critical Theory of Education: Habermas and Our Children's Future*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1990.
- Wilby, Peter. "Habermas and the Language of the Modern State." *New Society*, 47 (March 1979): 667-669.