

# BRIDGING COMPOSITION AND WOMEN'S STUDIES: THE WORK OF ANN E. BERTHOFF AND SUSANNE K. LANGER

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. . . I leave it to you to consider the implications of the fact that neither the philosopher [Susanne K. Langer] nor the artist [Barbara Hepworth] considers it paradoxical to speak of thinking and feeling as a single activity of forming. (And I leave it to you to consider that both are women).

Ann E. Berthoff (*The Making of Meaning* 65)

There is a compositive thought that thinks even in the rhythm of the fingers tapping on the keys of the typewriter.

Umberto Eco (*Postscript to the Name of the Rose* 42)

It is by now a commonplace among composition theorists and teachers that writing is both creative and critical, an activity that leads us to make meaning, to define ourselves and how we live in the world.<sup>1</sup> As ongoing debate reveals, however, writing is complicated by being both a private and social activity, involving individual cognition and psychology as well as the interaction of individuals with various discourse systems.<sup>2</sup> As difficult as it is for researchers to sort out how writing takes place, pity students, who

must adapt their nascent sense of identity to those often competing discourse systems that comprise their education. We know from teaching and research that student writers can lose the excitement that is part of intellectual discovery if this adaptation is not successful. As David Bartholomae convincingly argues, students learn to write within rules of academic discourses which are “both distinct and, even to a professional, mysterious” (135).

Compounding the mystery even further are the varied perspectives shaping our sense of how an individual learns to write. Whether we teach writing as part of separate disciplines or teach methods and conventions of different disciplines in a single writing course, we recognize that students must reset their voices and ideas about objectivity, argumentation, and structure with every class. Another field of study deeply concerned with these issues and becoming increasingly part of Composition Studies is Women’s Studies, which is concerned with the effects of curricula on students’ adaptation to the majority culture in which they will make their lives after school. Interdisciplinary by design, Women’s Studies sees its subject as the critique of knowledge in various social and cultural contexts.

Despite their shared concerns, Composition and Women’s Studies have not recognized their philosophical and pedagogical commonalities.<sup>3</sup> Although scholars in each field have explored relationships between subjectivity and learning and “power and pedagogy,” Composition has been committed to issues of culture, race, and class, while feminists attend to “women’s distinctive subjectivities and social interests” (Gabriel and Smithson, Schweickart 79).<sup>4</sup> It would be easy to add gender as a category of analysis for Composition Studies, but as Don Kraemer notes in an issue of *College English* “devoted to gender-related topics,” abstractions lead to “an intolerable neutrality” (Meese 376; Kraemer 379). Following his lead, I would like to create a bridge between Composition and Women’s Studies by revealing its presence in the work of Ann Berthoff and Susanne K. Langer.

Critiques by Langer and Berthoff of traditional distinctions between personal and scientific knowledge, between subjectivity and objectivity, and between thinking and feeling coincide with the interest of Women’s Studies and Composition. While Langer interrogates traditional theories of epistemology, Berthoff moves the inquiry to classroom practice. Pamela Annas, in her concern for non-traditional women students, addresses the need to translate

this critique into pedagogy. She reminds us of the philosophical and historical imperatives for acquiring knowledge that led to conventions of academic writing: "we have been trained to teach expository writing . . . that is defended, linear, and 'objective' . . . and to teach the use of abstract, logical, and impersonal, rather than sensual, contextual, and committed language" (360). Berthoff's philosophy is marked, in contrast, by what Paulo Freire describes as her "refusal to fall prey to false dichotomies that blindly separate creative and expository prose, her insistence in validating unique and personal experiences, [and] her brilliant elaboration of the important theory of imagination . . ." (XII).

In teaching that restores the primacy of feeling to thinking, Berthoff shares concerns with feminists about reconciling writing for self-discovery and for an academic audience.<sup>5</sup> Informed by Langer's analysis of expressive form, Berthoff's work gives philosophical strength to our worries about the ways subjective thinking has been devalued. Her philosophical and polemical presentations, her textbooks and reviews all call for critical uses of imagination. As she translates philosophies of mind and language into teaching, Berthoff demonstrates the powerful implications of Langer's alternative models of thinking for teaching writing.

Langer's study of excessiveness and Berthoff's call for the critical use of imagination suggest a dynamic psychology of the composing process. In her theory of "the mind in action making meaning," Berthoff laments distinctions between imaginative and critical thinking (*Reclaiming the Imagination*, Preface). She persistently critiques those who do not see imagination either as a way of knowing or as a means of making meaning because they understand imagination "as ancillary or subordinate, not as fundamental and primordial" (*The Making of Meaning* 64). Berthoff, in contrast, sees imagination as naming all functions of thinking: "forming, thinking, knowing, abstraction, meaning making, acting, creating, learning, interpreting" (RI Preface).

The back and forth moves in which we perceive, react, and discover different forms to express and understand our responses involve two modes of forming. Langer distinguishes them as discursive form and expressiveness. Discursive form uses language to describe, conceptualize, and reason; it is arrived at by means of generalization. But there is a kind of knowing which "defies discursive formulation" (*Expressiveness* 567): this is the process in which we name the subtly nuanced feelings that cannot be conveyed

by such all-encompassing words as love, hate, or fear (EX 568). Langer asserts that recognizing and representing ambiguous or specific feelings require a different kind of articulation. Expressive forms enable us to represent the experience of feeling complex relationships by “understanding one thing by another” in analogous relationships (EX 566). Thus, when Barbara Hepworth, quoted in Berthoff’s *Reclaiming the Imagination*, speaks of “a nut in a shell or a child in a womb,” (275) she reveals many interrelated feelings named as a “dynamic metaphor” (Langer, *Mind I* 157). This trope transforms realities we know subjectively into a form that we now see as objective.

In contrast to discursive abstraction, Hepworth discovers meaning through “presentational abstraction.” This is a symbolic form that allows her to express her idea of imaginative thinking in acutely personal terms—the mother-child relationship. At the same time, however, this subjective thinking is what gives the objective meaning. Thus the “architecture” of creative abstraction actually conveys meaning in the metaphor Hepworth creates (*Mind I*: 157). A “nut in the shell” articulates the “inside and outside to every form,” expressing the artist’s relationship to her work as part of the self, the whole self, and that which constitutes the outside of self (RI 275). Hepworth’s perception of feeling and form, subject and object, and the part and the whole work dialectically, that is, the perceiver and the perceived, interrelate. When we look back and forth between objects and our own responses to them, we build up layers of meaning incrementally. In this process, verbs or conjunctions will only approximate our “direct insight” (MM 66). These discursive tools—the ands and buts, the being and doing—that make syntactic connections cannot convey the sense of our overlapping and simultaneous responses. Only metaphor expresses the merging of feeling and thinking in Hepworth’s creative and critical process.

Metaphor therefore formulates a new conception for our “direct imaginative grasp” (Ex 570, 568).<sup>6</sup> Depicting a mental process of intellection and imagination that proceeds without generalization, metaphor or expressiveness encourages us to create insights capable of testing realities outside ourselves. Only by studying how each of us fuses thinking and feeling into activities of forming can we create a theory of imagination that can result in writing in which students “*feel* the activity of their minds” (Berthoff, “Is Teaching Still Possible” 753).

Berthoff's *Reclaiming the Imagination* actually dramatizes Langer's expressive form.<sup>7</sup> The relationships that emerge in reading her anthology suggest that the book itself is a metaphor for the process of creating expressive form. Collectively, the selections by various artists and writers argue that affective thinking is a result of interactions among our sensory organs, perception, memory, and unconscious feeling as we come into contact with the external world. For example, Berthoff quotes Jane Addams describing such a collective experience in her recollection of a visit to an ancient Egyptian tomb:

At moments my adult intelligence would be unexpectedly submerged by the emotional message which was written there. Rising to the surface like a flood, this primitive emotion would sweep away both the historic record and the adult consciousness interested in it, leaving only a child's mind struggling through an experience which it found overwhelming. (RI 249).

Addams translates the feelings that emerge from a fusion of childhood memory and perception into artistic consciousness. She sees the tombs as a metaphor representing a house safe from the "formless peril" she recalls having felt as a child (RI 250-51). Her affective thinking represents her whole experience compressed into a moment of being, composed of such complex feeling that conventional names cannot do them justice. Her sense impressions can only be presented as a process in which emotional experience is transformed into conceptualization. The articulation of this process reveals the inextricable bond between emotional and intellectual experience.<sup>8</sup>

The figurative language of Addams and Hepworth remains private until set into play with other artists and audiences. In turn, as artists and writers respond to influences and interpretation, their work reflects the cultural shape of creative imagination. These contexts ensure that imagemaking does not just personify personal need, that is, represent a fantasy whose meaning remains untested, as a personal reverie, but a critical and social process. Expressiveness makes metaphor even more affecting as it goes through a stage Langer refers to as "the objectification of feeling" (*Mind I* 87). This is the process by which we understand the lasting impact of feeling and memory as "the logic of consciousness" (Ex 570).

In this way Jane Addams understands the impact of her own

primary emotional experience through her engagement with the cultural artifacts of another time, another place, and another people. As she visits the tombs which commemorate the attempts of ancient Egyptians to overcome fears of death, she understands how “each individual is destined to the same devastating experience” (RI 253). Her experience, however, is more than identification or empathy. The images she sees and which give significance to her emotional experience represent human experience apart from herself. Her presentation has been interpretive, reflecting the art that inspires her response as “an objective presentation” (*Mind* I 64).

Invariably, as we see in art, the most powerful metaphors are those which signify efforts to understand our fears and losses as part of a wider context. Thus the power of “Paradise Lost” can be accounted for as a metaphor capable of expressing changing personal and cultural experience. New forms of expression by different artists become critical tools by which to analyze our complex relationships with language and experiences apart from our own. When George Eliot refers to “the golden gates of childhood forever closed behind” in *The Mill on the Floss*, she offers a new view of an individual’s loss of primary satisfaction. As a Victorian woman writer she glosses Milton’s text with gender and culture, just as readers gloss Eliot and Milton with the contexts of their own identities, discovering new meaning.

As the metaphor of paradise lost reveals, critical thinking must include a recognition of audiences and thinking distinct from our own fantasies and conceptions. Thinking metaphorically or expressively demands such critique in its very definition. As Berthoff notes in “The Logic of Metaphor,” as we name, “[w]e identify and differentiate simultaneously” (MM 129). Thus metaphor implies a method of seeing the like and the unlike in all relations between ourselves and external phenomena.<sup>9</sup>

Metaphor invites the reader to make meaning as we explore more complex relationships between objects, our experience of them, and our relationships to other readers. Among the meanings we make are those between the forms of objects and the forms we construct to represent objects, and between ourselves as readers and writers, for we have different responses to art, to the natural world outside ourselves, and even to each other’s reactions to them.<sup>10</sup> Subjectivity becomes intersubjectivity: an alliance of objective and subjective as creator and audience make mean-

ing in their interaction with the forms of creative expression.<sup>11</sup> Addams' experience thus illustrates Knoblauch and Brannon's conclusion that "[t]he concept of 'objectivity' falsely reifies what is always profoundly human (and therefore interpretive) about our understanding [while] the concept of 'subjectivity' falsely encloses consciousness, separating human understanding from the world that conditions its action . . ." (Knowing 18). Note how Addams makes meaning of otherwise undecipherable signs through her critical identification with forms that originate within and beyond her experience.

Both Langer and Berthoff privilege a complex of relationships as the dynamic that makes thinking expressively possible: relationships among mental functions, between thinking and feeling, and among the distinctive perceptions, observations, and apprehensions of self and other. In her discussion of Berthoff and Langer, Hephzibah Roskelly describes this mental process as "a relational order" (99). Metaphor can then be seen as the expressive form that enacts this method of relational thinking. Indeed, when Langer says that "art has a logic of its own," she qualifies this by adding "and by 'a logic' I mean a relational structure" (*Mind I* 84). In "The Logic of Metaphor" at the heart of *Reclaiming the Imagination*, Berthoff concludes: "metaphor illuminates the relationship of imagination and language" (129). Dismissed historically by rationalists and positivists as poetic, non-rational representation, metaphor or relational thinking demonstrates a new psychology suggested by connections between the philosophies of Berthoff and Langer and feminist psychoanalytic theory.<sup>12</sup>

Like feminist theorists, Langer and Berthoff observe that all experience is subjective and critical at the same time. Langer validates the existence of feeling in all thinking when she describes the evolution of abstraction in human mentality. Arguing with those who treat abstract and logical thinking as "incompatible with emotional response" ("Emotion and Abstraction" 62), she presents evidence from the fields of psychology of perception, neurology, and physiology that abstract thinking derives from "spontaneous emotional reactions" (EA 62).<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the forms by which we express a complex of symbolic activity, including "reflective judging, predicting . . . and interpretation" contain "the emotional charge" from which it originally derives (EA 70, 71).

Langer's work on expressiveness and Berthoff's recovery of imagination to our understanding of cognition coincide with the

conclusions of American feminists who are reshaping the criteria by which we judge moral and intellectual behavior. Critiquing models of moral development which exclude relative, emotionally based decision-making, feminists argue that affective, relational thinking is not inferior, but as Carol Gilligan concludes, “a different voice” that conceives of external worlds as human and relative, not as abstract and absolute. Mary Belenky and her colleagues explore relational thinking through studies of women’s self-perception. Their results show that because women see themselves as interdependent with others, they are receptive to their feelings as ways of knowing or apprehending the reality of others.

Empathy, for women, becomes a way of knowing as they use their own feelings to understand the thinking and feeling of others. Gilligan observes: “Woman’s world is a world of relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a perception of the need for response” (30). According to Barbara Johnson, “Gilligan’s difference arises out of the impossibility of maintaining a rigorously logical binary model for ethical choices” (33).<sup>14</sup> Based on Nancy Chodorow’s object relations model of psychoanalysis, feminists claim that women’s sense of relatedness enables them to write with more fluid boundaries between form and content, between genres, and in metaphors which express this sense of relatedness.<sup>15</sup>

Although some feminists argue that relational thinking is a special attribute of women, others observe how this new description can become a dangerous prescription because it echoes old injunctions for constraints based on biology.<sup>16</sup> The critical connection between relational thinking and expressiveness made by the structure of *Reclaiming the Imagination* raises difficult questions for feminist theory and composition alike. For as the voices of Berthoff’s artists express and analyze how mind, body, and external stimuli interact, we are forced to recognize that artists and women have historically shared the same exile. Busloads of people attesting to the prestige of travelling exhibits of Monet and King Tut make it easy to forget that like some contemporary art under attack today, those treasures were once defiled as subversive and primitive. Tamed by official approval, the power of art nevertheless remains suspicious because its source, like that of women’s relational thinking, is emotional, and therefore unaccountable and beyond control. With no “scientific” categories to contain it, art



is mystified as “sacred power,” outside legitimate investigation (RI 262). Like women, artists are viewed as the mysterious, irrational “other,” a term used by Simone de Beauvoir to expose the defensive rationalizing that supports the proposition that women are irrational and therefore unknowable and potentially dangerous to cultural norms. De Beauvoir argues that as long as women do not fit the philosophical and political models of the “norm,” they remain unknowable and can be judged deviant.<sup>17</sup> As a result of this judgment, prevailing models of cultural norms can be used to justify the claim that women are intellectually inferior.

Berthoff reclaims the imaginative powers of artists and women in the artist’s studio, a place that illustrates the merging of objective and subjective, thinking and feeling, by becoming the laboratory setting for “the dialectic of creativity and criticism” (RI 262). What is significant for the teaching of writing in this “laboratory” is that thinking expressively means to think critically. Moreover, it is a learned activity that men and women students ought to be taught so that they can use their most fundamentally and deeply imagined experiences in the service of cognition and discovery in writing. To value relational thinking would mean that there was no “other.” Pamela Annas notes that in teaching expository writing, we “‘wean’ students from subjectivity into objectivity” (360). Because of its social and institutional support, this process perpetuates the denigration of women’s subjectivity by encouraging men to ignore theirs. An alternative to prevailing conventions begins with the proposition that if all knowledge begins with the knower, then what can be more insightful than the knower’s undefensive relation to affective thinking, to what Berthoff calls “the uses of chaos; the foolishness of depending on inspiration; the wisdom of depending on inspiration; the role of practice; the ambiguities of ‘the audience’ ” (RI 262).

If composition teachers find themselves detoured in their efforts to teach the unity of thinking and feeling, they can find assurance in models of teaching writing as a critical discovery of the self in the many worlds in which we live. Revising Cartesian distinctions which valorize mind as the province of men and devalue the emotional and relational experience of women, feminists show how the latter is absolutely necessary to the former.<sup>18</sup> Rather than merely reversing the privilege and demeaning intellect, feminist theorists insist on critique as methodology. Critical methods such as Belenky, *et al*’s “connected knowledge” can be used to evaluate

women's relation to the ideologies, histories, and conventions that shape the worlds in which they live.<sup>19</sup> A primary method of Women's Studies is to use the language that legitimizes these signifiers in order to expose and review their gender-related assumptions. By reading critically and writing both subjectively and analytically, students can learn to value their own experiences as touchstones for academic learning. Such an approach views writing both as interdisciplinary and as a process of discovery precisely because it views language as emotionally, intellectually, and politically engaged.

Applying these principles can bridge the efforts of composition teachers in basic writing courses with the demands of academic disciplines. Most importantly, as we teach thinking and feeling as a unified activity, we sensitize all students, men and women alike, to examine how social, psychological, and academic conventions that shape writing imply as well the necessity of critical evaluation. Only then do we teach that language is more than grammatical and syntactical rules; we teach students to read and write by understanding the cultural and political contexts in which language constantly shifts meaning. In this way students can develop rhetorical strategies directed at different audiences and across disciplines while asserting the validity of their own experience.

This critical process can be applied to all theories that confront our sense of making meaning. Ann Berthoff's thought dramatizes the context in which student writing must be viewed. As a philosopher and teacher of writing, she writes for an audience of men and women who are directing radical changes in the structures and curriculum of writing classes but who are also answerable to the conventions and methodologies which govern thinking and writing across the disciplines. As we support individual writing needs and encourage self-awareness as tools of empowerment, we must also be aware that students' voices must accord with the demands of other courses. The combination of self-awareness and academic writing, however, prepares students to critique method, style, evidence, and conclusions. This intersubjectivity coincides with Berthoff's concept of "the consciousness of consciousness," which is achieved only by "looking and looking again" (MM 65).<sup>20</sup> Her method insists on a dialectic movement between writer, text and reader that leads to awareness of the implications of reading and writing. As we interact with texts, we

learn how we see ourselves in them while discovering the differences.

We need to explore such thinking with our students in order that they may engage in an ongoing process of feeling, perception and intellection, where, as knowers, they critique their experiences and those of others. That Annas's new writing course is feminist in context is no accident. Through their interdisciplinary curricula, both Composition and Women's Studies classrooms openly explore the constraints of specialized methodological concerns. The commitment to encourage student thinking and writing is also realized in the non-hierarchical classroom structures frequently used in Composition and Women's Studies. Using student writing as texts, peer review, small group work, and revision all allow students to be agents of their own learning. Women's Studies courses frequently use students as group facilitators and have them develop their own discussion questions. These methods are rarely used outside writing and Women's Studies courses.

Feminist pedagogy also offers a clear pathway to more traditional academic study, for it provides a basis for more rigorous and yet personalized study of different disciplines. The following example of student writing grapples with connections between relational thinking and expressive form by analyzing a metaphor which gives meaning to a personal experience. The writing was produced in my course, Women Writing, a joint offering of the Women's Studies Program and the English Composition Board, which fulfilled an upper level writing requirement at The University of Michigan. Although we were concerned primarily with gender-related issues, the course was designed to be interdisciplinary, using materials from the humanities and social sciences. The essay responded to the first three sections of *Reclaiming the Imagination*: "The Intelligent Eye," "Body and Soul," and "Abstraction." Exploring how perception begins with the body, students had the opportunity to go either to the University Museum of Art or the Museum of Archaeology. They chose an artifact which especially appealed to them and described it in the kind of visual detail the reader could imagine. They then traced their responses to their experiences and preconceptions in an attempt to test the notion of perception's origin in the body.

The paper was to be revised after volunteers read their first drafts to the class and following individual conferences with me. At first, the notion of body produced some comic results, as in

the paper claiming that the writer's body "knew how the boy hovering over his porridge bowl felt because she too was hungry." Most of the results, however, revealed critical connections that showed readers how impression led to insight and to self-reflection. One student wrote of Derain's "Carnival Figures":

I am fascinated with the way Harlequinesque figures merge drama and disguise. It is as if the figures have been liberated from their own identity and are free to enter into the realm of make-believe. I know the temptation of disguise, and nothing inspires pretense like a dress with an outrageous personality of its own. There is a showy flair and something uniquely feminine and spirited in the way the woman in the red dress turns her head and simultaneously grabs up her dress. I, too, have worn a long and full red dress, caught up in a carnival feeling, stepping out of myself temporarily—ridiculous, ostentatious, but fun.

Merging with the object of analysis invites an interplay of emotion and interpretation, expressed through the metaphor of disguise. The writer accomplishes this by reading and writing intersubjectively. Relating actions and impact, she moves back and forth between subjective experience and a reality apart from yet integral to expressing her personal identity. In the process, she discovers the metaphor which both articulates and analyzes her choices and fantasies. Her metaphoric discourse includes the "mental, emotional and sensory units" that Langer says interrelate the creation of experience with the education of emotion.<sup>21</sup> Her relational thinking affirms a "different voice" while endorsing the possibility of change through educating the senses and critical perceptions of others. The primary experience of this student's writing enables the reader to see the universal in the concrete, not generalized, but abstracted in the sense that she creates forms or images which contain both feeling and its meaning. She combines affective and cognitive in a "whole experience" (L in RI 40-41). As the writer objectifies feeling, she develops "our intuition, teaching eye and ear to perceive expressive form . . . in actuality as well as in art" (*Mind I*, 87).

This student wants to revise this version again, studying the androgynous figures of Harlequin and Pierrot in *commedia del arte*. As she engages in academic research, she explores her education. Inspired by art, she privileges the sensual, but then learns

to objectify the subjective in history. It is this process that I see Berthoff and Langer teaching us and that enables our students to enter conventional academic settings feeling a renewed sense of themselves.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>I am relying on David Bartholomae's use of "commonplace." See James Britton, Peter Elbow, C.H. Knoblauch, Lil Brannon, William E. Coles, Jr., and Ann E. Berthoff, among others who pioneered this as classroom practice.

<sup>2</sup>See Flower and Hays for their pioneering work in cognition and most recently, Miller.

<sup>3</sup>Elizabeth Flynn observes that "the fields of feminist studies and composition studies have not engaged each other in a serious or systematic way" (114).

<sup>4</sup>See *Gender in the Classroom: Power and Pedagogy*. Ed. Susan L. Gabriel and Isaiah Smithson. On issues of class and minority students see Patricia Bizzell and Andrew Sledd.

<sup>5</sup>Isaiah Smithson delineates how male and female "modes" have been demarcated to disadvantage women students.

<sup>6</sup>On the debate about metaphor analysis, see Paul Kameen.

<sup>7</sup>Hephzibah Roskelly explores the idea of "chaos and forming" in the related work of Berthoff and Langer.

<sup>8</sup>While the dynamic Addams describes is similar to primary process in psychoanalytic theory, Langer objected to Freud's idea of the unconscious because it is a system rather than a series of functions or a process. See "The Process of Feeling," (21-22) in *Philosophical Sketches*. Langer notes an association with Anton Ehrenzweig's study of the creative process in her discussion of "the emotive act," but does not pursue conceptual connections between his insights and hers, "Emotion and Abstraction" in PS, 71. His work, however, as it attempts to show the unconscious movement from primary or undifferentiated cognition or creativity or secondary elaboration or critical form is noteworthy.

<sup>9</sup>John E. Searle lays out strategies which must be shared by speaker and listener for interpreting meaning in metaphor.

<sup>10</sup>See Fish, Bleich, Tompkins, and Schweickart, among other approaches to social constructions of reading and writing.

<sup>11</sup>Bleich studies the intersubjective aspect of cognition.

<sup>12</sup>Kenneth Burke shows how the non-rational component of metaphor is essential to its value in illumination because it reveals "hitherto unsuspected connectives [as in] the progressions of a dream" (119).

<sup>13</sup>Although feminist philosophers are committed to critiquing male-centered schools of thought, two important recent anthologies fail to even mention Langer. See Garry and Pearsall and Jaggar and Bordo. Uma Narayan critiques the feminist attack on positivism.

<sup>14</sup>Shoshana Felman deconstructs "the binary, metaphysical structure of the Classical Age of [Descartes]: Being and Non-being, Error and Truth, is now replaced by a three term anthropological structure: Man, his madness, and his truth" (40). Like Berthoff, Felman calls attention to C.S. Peirce's theory of the reading effect (and of the transference effect) as the dynamic interpretant of the text" where there is a triadic relationship between writer, text and reader (31).

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, Judith Kegan Gardiner and Margaret Homans. Caroline Whitbeck's "feminist ontology," a conception of the self-other relation, is "neither oppositional nor dyadic," but is based on the "mutual realization of people" (51-52).

<sup>16</sup>Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray critique Cartesian distinctions, arguing that subjectivity is the province of women, whose bodily instincts influence sexual experience and the creative process. Among those who critique the French Feminists are Susan Rubin Suleiman and Elaine Showalter.

<sup>17</sup>Luce Irigaray would like to see women writers, as "the Other," subvert patriarchal discourse by recreating language from the internal logic and metaphors deriving from women's "diversified, multiple" sexuality. In *Mind I Langer* distinguishes between "perception of artistic form" and interpretation as "exegesis," which cannot derive "the vital impact of a work of art" (84).

<sup>18</sup>Carol McMillan questions both masculinist and feminist assumptions that feelings and love cannot be indicative of judgment and knowledge, and the corollary to this, that morality must be independent of affection" (17).

<sup>19</sup>Susan Bordo studies the ideological and psychodynamics of the "father" of such binary oppositions, Descartes. She sees his "model of knowledge . . . based on clarity and dispassion and detachment, [representing] anxiety over separation . . . from the organic female universe of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance" (440-441). See Genevieve Lloyd as well.

<sup>20</sup>Jessica Benjamin develops a theory of intersubjectivity as psychological and cognitive space in which women create.

<sup>21</sup>According to Hugh G. Petrie, who studies the interactive function of metaphor, this process creates knowledge:

. . . because if it *creates* similarities, then it could provide the bridge between a student's earlier conceptual and representational schemes and the latter scheme of the totally unfamiliar subject to be learned by the student. Interactive metaphor would allow truly new forms of knowledge and understanding to be acquired by the student without presupposing the student already knows, in some sense, that which is being learned" ("Metaphor and Learning" 442).

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