

## CASE STUDY

# **Camp Randall Memorial Stadium Case Study: University of Wisconsin -October 30, 1993**

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&

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## INTRODUCTION

The case study method is used in numerous business schools to help highlight how a business or organization responded to specific facts or situations. The same technique is commonly seen in sport management programs with textbooks dedicated to case method analysis for sport marketing decisions. Case studies are often used in sport law classes to examine a court's decision based on the facts highlighted by the court. However, it is very difficult to develop case studies since the information necessary often is very difficult to find. In the legal contexts, real cases are often only seen in appellate court decisions, which normally do not highlight all the critical facts and even some of the minor facts that could have provided valuable clues for how management should have responded. Sport law cases rarely have all the discovery documentation upon which a judge and/or jury would analyze. Without having sufficient background information, students will have a harder time really understanding a case and being able to apply its conclusion to other settings. The following case study has been successfully

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\* Special thanks to the following students from Professor Fried's Crowd Management Class: Antonio DiPaolo, Josh Havelka, ChrissAnn Hayes, Jennifer K Megan Kavanagh, and Tom Saunders.

developed through obtaining official documents used or relied upon by the court or the various parties involved in the Camp Randall tragedy.

In 1993 the University of Wisconsin's football team was having a tremendous season and was competing to represent the Big Ten athletic conference in the Rose Bowl game. Only a couple more victories stood in the way of reaching the Rose Bowl and one of those games was against the University of Michigan. The game was hard fought and won by Wisconsin, but even before the game ended tragedy struck. Before the game started there were signs that trouble might occur. An advertisement in the student newspaper encouraged fans to rush the field. Even with the knowledge to prepare for the worst, fans started crushing each other before the game ended. The result was a mass crush of human flesh that twisted metal railings, bent fences, injured over 70 fans, and generated significant negative publicity and 11 lawsuits.

Could the injuries have been avoided? Could administrators have made different decisions based on the information available before the game? Through analyzing the facts available before and after the game, some real world learning and application can be taught to sport management students. This study starts with sport risk management issues and some specific concerns identified by the Big Ten Conference. The study then highlights specific factual information about Camp Randall Memorial Stadium. Through analyzing data associated with the incident, the factual background will be set forth along with strategies undertaken, proposed strategies that could have been used, and some more recent research that could impact how administrators could deal with similar concerns today. Even though the incident occurred in 1993, numerous similar problems have occurred more recently, which makes the case as relevant now as it was then.

It is hoped that this teaching resource will provide students an opportunity to examine how cases are developed, but more importantly how risk management strategies are researched, developed, and executed. If students are able to take information from prior cases and learn how current events can impact risk management decisions, students can become more accustomed to applying risk management strategies in the sport environment.

### SPORT RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk represents any uncertainty about the future whether it is a financial, political, structural, or any other concern that might affect assets-whether people, property, financial, intellectual, and even business goodwill. Risk

management is the discipline that tries to manage the threat that a future event can/will cause harm (Appenzeller, 1998).

To help reduce the potential for serious injuries, death, property damage, and numerous other risks, a risk management program is often developed. Risk management is a continuously updated process designed to protect an intended item, person, or property. To be effective, a risk management plan needs to be global in perspective, forward-looking, integrated with other strategies, and developed through teamwork that has incorporated a shared vision by all those who will be impacted

Risk management can be viewed as a defensive strategy and/or an offensive strategy. Risks can be viewed as positive and negative. The manner in which sport executives view risks are a combination of variables including:

- the risk atmosphere and if the sport executive is risk adverse or encourages risk taking,
- the executive's life experiences,
- regulatory mandates such as NCAA rules or government regulations, and
- the effect of recent event/experiences on those who have to make the decisions and those impacted by the decisions- for example has there been a recent legal claim (Head, 2004).

Several strategies can be used to help appreciate and more effectively apply risk management principles. These strategies can include the five "Ds" and the ECT approach highlighted in some sport law texts (Fried, 1999). There is no one correct risk management technique, but any risk management program will focus on identifying risks and then developing solutions to minimize/mitigate the risks. The focus of one risk management strategy is highlighted by the five "Ds."

**DETER-** is the process of making the sport facility or program inaccessible or difficult to damage. A sample form of deterrence could include daily monitoring fields to installing a video monitoring system.

**DETECT-** is accomplished through intelligence sharing to identify a risk before it injures someone.

**DENY-** is the attempt to minimize or delay the degree of damage that could be caused by a risk.

DEVALUE- is the process of making a sport organization of little or no value to an attorney. If contracts or insurance spread liability to others then the sport organization will have some level of protection.

DEFY- is the process of going forward after a tragedy and getting back on the proverbial horse to help show the sport organization's resolve (Fried, 2004a).

Risk management is advocated by numerous sport law authors to help prevent both minor and major risks (Appenzeller (Ed.), 1998; Fried, 1999; Fried, 2004a; van der Smissen, 1990). While the potential for injuries in minor accidents might be small, major accidents can lead to significant losses. A number of major calamities have befallen major sporting events over the years. Some of the more infamous stadium/arena tragedies or incidents are highlighted in Table 1 below.



TABLE 1

*Major Sport Calamities*

Date	Facility	Country	Event	Results
1955	Le Mans Race Track	France	Grand Prix	82 killed (a)
1964	Lima	Peru	Soccer Match	300 killed/500 injured (r)
10/68	City Streets	Michigan	World Series Celeb.	200 arrested (r)
1/21/71	Ibrox Stadium	Scotland	Soccer Match	66 killed/170 injured (s)
10/71	City Streets	Pittsburgh	World Series Celeb.	100 arrested/injured (r)
1979	Riverfront Stadium	Ohio	Who Concert	11 killed (s)
1979	City College	New York	Rap Concert	9 killed/29 injured (s)
10/20/82	Lenin Stadium	Russia	Soccer Match	340 killed (s)
5/29/82	Heysel Stadium	Belgium	European Cup-soccer	41 killed/400 injured (r)
11/83	City Streets	Toronto	Grey Cup Celebration	22 arrested (r)
10/84	City Streets	Detroit	World Series Celeb.	1 killed/80 injured (r)
5/11/85	Bradford Stadium	England	Victory Celebration	55 killed/200 injured (f)
3/12/88	Katmandu	Nepal	Soccer Match	80 killed (s)
4/15/89	Sheffield Stadium	England	Soccer F.A. Cup	95 killed/200 injured (f)
9/26/89	City Streets	Bangladesh	Soccer	100 injured/129 arrest (r)
1990	Orkney Stadium	South Africa	Soccer	42 killed (s)
6/90	City Streets	Detroit	NBA Final Celeb.	8 killed/100 arrested (r)
1/18/91	Delta Center	Utah	AC/DC Concert	3 killed (s)
6/7/91	City Streets	Chile	Soccer Celebration	10 killed/128 injured (r)
6/92	City Streets	Chicago	NBA Final Celeb.	Over 1,000 arrested (r)
6/93	City Streets	Montreal	NHL Final Celeb.	168 injured (r)
6/93	City Streets	Chicago	NBA Final Celeb.	2 killed/682 arrested (r)
10/30/93	Camp Randall Stadium	Wisconsin	Football	70 injured (s)
6/94	City Streets	Vancouver	NHL Final Loss	1 killed/200 injured (r)
10/16/96	Mateo Flores Stadium	Guatemala	World Cup-Qualif.	84 killed/147 injured (s)
1999	Michigan State	Michigan	Final Four	132 arrested in riots
2000	Ellis Park Stadium	South Africa	Soccer	43 killed/250 injured (r)
12/30/00	Sao Januario Stadium	Brazil	Soccer	150 injured (s)
2002	Indiana	Indiana	Final Four	30 arrested in riots

Legend: (s) refers to a crowd surge case, (a) auto accident, (r) riot, (f) refers to an in stadium/arena fire (Young, 2000 & Fried, 2004a).

These incidents are in addition to numerous riots after football, basketball and hockey events (NCAA, 2003a; Young, 2000) Soccer and football are not alone in crowd related problems. Crowd disorders have been reported in traditionally rougher crowd sports such as baseball, basketball, cricket and ice hockey, and in more subdued sports such as golf and horse racing (Young).

One tragedy that did not result in any deaths, but did result in a number of injuries occurred in 1993 at a football game between the University of Wisconsin ("UW") and the University of Michigan. Both schools are members of the prestigious Big Ten Conference, which has a long history of successful football programs (Big Ten Conference Official Site, 2003). One would

expect that a conference with decades of experience hosting large events would have had a set of acceptable crowd management procedures for their member institutions. In actuality, the conference had not created these policies, which forced each university to develop their own plans for insuring crowd safety.

Crowd safety is an important part of any risk management plan. The Big Ten schools had varied systems in 1993 for handling crowds based on different facility concerns. For example, Penn State University had a 21,000-seat student section, while The Ohio State University did not have a student section. UW, Iowa, Ohio State, and Northwestern had at least some general admission seating options. With respect to security, some universities outsourced security needs, while others kept all aspects in-house using students and staff as security personnel (Big Ten Conference, 1993b). Some stadiums had seats elevated above the field (eight of the 11 stadiums), but all had barriers between the stands and the field. Since every facility is different in terms of its shape, configuration, seating bowl, and demographics, it is impossible to implement the same security and safety techniques at two different facilities. Even without a plan that can be applied to each facility (see Table 2 below) due to their differences, the Big Ten universities still need to try to apply risk management strategies that will often have overlapping elements as well as some significant different strategies.

TABLE 2

*Big Ten Stadium Survey Results from 1993*

Institution	Seating Capacity	StudentSection	# Security	# Ushers
Northwestern	30,000	7,220	17	200
Indiana	52,180	7,600	80-100	230-240
Minnesota	64,000	1,800	20	180-205
Purdue	67,861	6,000	70	222
Iowa	70,000	8,200	30	200-270
Illinois	72,000	9,000	75-80	365-400
Michigan State	76,000	7,000-16,000	60	146
Wisconsin	77,745	11,800	65	125-180
Ohio State	90,000	none	25-125	800
Penn State	93,400	21,000	100	298-375
Michigan	105,000	19,000	60	400-450

(Kaiser and Hyer, 1994)

Based on these disparate and unique seating options, security numbers, and usher number it is very difficult to establish any type of crowd management standards or protocols since every facility, school, game, and environment will be different and will require unique risk management strategies.

### CAMP RANDALL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Camp Randall Stadium has a storied past that dates back to 1858 when the land was used as the Wisconsin State fairgrounds. Over the next 50 years the University of Wisconsin began building a football stadium. By the time the first home game was played in 1895, the stadium had a capacity of 3,000 spectators, but 15,000 fans showed up for the game (Camp Randall Stadium, 2003). Thus, the school had to retroactively find a way to allow for more seating. For the next 20 years the school used temporary bleachers, and in 1914 the entire bleacher section on the north side of the field was condemned as unsafe. In 1915 temporary bleachers were installed to accommodate the anticipated 15,000 fans for homecoming. A loud cracking sound was heard at the start of the second quarter and three sections of the bleachers collapsed,



taking down 1,800 fans, with almost no serious injuries (Feldman, 2003). The collapse was blamed at the time on recent rains that saturated the ground and the freeze-thaw cycle.

The school continued to add to the stadium's capacity between 1917 and 1967 and raised the total number of seats to its current capacity of 76,129 through 13 separate expansion projects. The stadium was built primarily with concrete, structural tile, asphalt, floor tile, and Cemesto ceiling and wall panels (Camp Randall Stadium, 2003). A 1972 Wisconsin Bureau of Facilities Management analysis graded the stadium at 58%, with the facility showing major deficiencies in "Physical Characteristics" and "Codes and Safety." (Edwards, et. al, 1972). A 1990 study concluded that the 1957 renovations of the stands severely constricted the exit width at each corner (SRI Design, 1990). The report concluded that the constricted exits represented an unacceptable hazard.

The major problem with the facility's physical status was directly attributable to how the stadium was expanded. Each addition to the structure was aging at a different rate, which eventually led to facility problems such as: the concrete floor was quite uneven and sloped very steeply to the large drains creating a hazard for people in large crowds, and the concourse which was closed for construction, significantly restricted access (Edwards, et. al, 1972). It is also important to note that the findings did not show a security or signal system had been installed. These findings infer that the expansions to Camp Randall Stadium were built to meet the increasing demand of spectators, and not to address safety concerns.

While the stadium satisfied many of the building code requirements in the 1970s, the stadium's egress (exiting direction) capabilities were poor. While there were four exits, only two exits were available for fans to use and those exits were a mere 8 feet and 9.5 feet in width. According to a State of Wisconsin study of the stadium, the stadium was required to have at least four exits with a width of 22 feet for every 500 spectators (State of Wisconsin, 1990). The study also found:

Occupants exit directly via the playing field apron and the North and South gates. . .severely restricted exit width at each corner of the field. The resulting congestion is clearly illustrated. . .and constitutes an unacceptable hazard.

No public exits that meet satisfactory or safe specifications for the egress of large numbers of people from the stands (Edwards, et. al, 1972, p. 8)



Even after such a study illustrating major concerns and potential code violations at the stadium, there was no record of any changes or construction to address these concerns produced during the litigation process. The only material produced addressed planning for the event and dealing with crowd capacity related issues as they occurred. Even though the facility's condition was not a major focus of the stampede cases, it is impossible to separate crowd management strategies and procedures from the impact a facility plays on crowds.

Clay Christenson, a code enforcement officer for the Madison Fire Department indicated there could have been code violations concerning seat width and capacity. However, the stadium was inspected in July 1993 and there were minor violations, primarily related to blocked aisles in the structure's interior (Seely, 1993). The stadium was inspected by the Fire Department twice a year, but the inspections were done when the facility was empty and seating capacity was not part of the inspection (Seely). If the Fire Department did not conduct the investigation it was up to the university, based on the honor system, to make sure capacity was not exceeded (Seely).

A preliminary report of the stadium's code compliance after the 1993 tragedy showed that the exit onto the track comprised an exit into an open court and the building code specifically provided for only one needed means of egress when an aisles or exit way entered into an open court (Murray, 1993). Thus, the stadium had possible building code concerns. A question was raised whether the area around the track was still in compliance if the fenced area were full. However, while this question was not answered, there was enough room between the fence and the grandstand railing (between 93 and 122 inches to accommodate all fans exiting Section P and half of those exiting Section Q). Two code violations were identified including seats being reduced from 18 the 17 inches and the aisles leading to the top of the portal exit in Section P being only 32 inches wide when it should have been 42 inches wide (Murray). However, any possible code violation would be only a minor issue when a crowd is surging uncontrollably down the stands.

### Student Seating

Fans misbehavior had been a common occurrence at UW home games in the past (Hesselberg, 1993). Prior problems included throwing projectiles and body passing. In the 1980s it was common for around 75 fans to be arrested each game for alcohol, ticket scalping, body passing, and throwing objects. In response, policies were passed outlawing body passing and a buffer zone was created around the students including adding general public seating above the

student section. In 1983 Iowa team members were pelted with eggs and booze (Hesselberg). In a 1985 game a fan threw a section of bleachers over the stadium wall and 174 fans were ejected (Hesselberg). In a September 1985 game, four fans were injured and 108 people were ejected. The various incidents in the student section from the 1980s through the early 1990s highlight a rowdy and energetic crowd.

Due to decreased attendance associated with poor performance in the 1980s, fans had to find a way to entertain themselves during games. Fan misconduct started increasing with fans throwing hard plastic cups, breaking bleachers, and then throwing marshmallows. The tradition of throwing marshmallows is discussed under Game Day Action, but it should be noted that to encourage students to stop throwing small metal objects at opposing players, the University encouraged them to throw less dangerous marshmallows. While there were previous problems in the student section, the 1993 tragedy was much greater than any of the prior incidents as one reporter who covered the Badgers since the 1930s indicated that he had never seen the fence or railing go down before (Hesselberg, 1993).

#### ADDITIONAL PRE-EVENT INFORMATION

A significant amount of additional information was available from which the University, Fire Marshal, police, security company, and athletic department could have developed the risk management or crowd management plan. While a significant amount of information is highlighted below, it should be noted that much of the data was acquired after the event. This represents a significant fact, in that while there might be a significant amount of information, the information might not be easy to obtain or synthesize before a tragedy, and only after a tragedy can the right material be analyzed. For example, with the World Trade Center disaster of 9/11, anti-terror risk strategies could have been developed using appropriate research and drills, but that could not properly prepare someone for planes crashing into the buildings. Thus, while information might be available before an event, that information might have limited value in light of the context for an event. Often, the information only makes sense after an event or tragedy occurs.

Situational analysis could have highlighted additional possible concerns. For example, how much weight should have been given to the fact that the game was played on Halloween or that it was being played on Daylight Savings day, which provided the students with an extra hour to drink in the bars? It also should be noted that the game was officially designated as part of

"Parents' Day," where parents were encouraged to come to campus and visit their children. Each fact could have been important and combined could have been crucial for officials to analyze and implement appropriate strategies.

### SYNTHESIZING THE INFORMATION INTO A PLAN

The University utilized crowd management policy and procedures from an instruction manual and a crowd tactics sheet. The University used a 44-page Crowd Management and Security Instruction Manual that provided a general guide to managing events at the facility. This manual addressed job responsibilities, including managing crowd migration. Under the manual's instructions for portal control, the manual provided in part that, "Personnel must pass only those holding tickets for the portal or section. DO NOT, under any circumstances, permit a patron to enter the portal if patron does not present a proper ticket for the area." (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1988, p. 25). The guide also covered issues such as:

- security not leaving their post without approval,
- key supervisors being responsible for admission control, patron directional flow, maintaining order, and to insure the best possible safety and service for spectators,
- ushers being positioned where they can best control spectator flow and ensure all spectators are seated and not sitting in the aisle-ways,
- ushers were also instructed to remain in the aisles and not obstruct viewing the game while keeping aisles clear,
- roving patrols were necessary to insure patrons are properly seated and safe,
- portal control personnel were required to stand in the center of the portal and restrict access except in the last five minutes of the game they were to move to the field for crowd control at their supervisor's request. In this new crowd management position the portal control personnel were supposed to face the crowd and prevent anyone from climbing over the fence onto the field and after the game they were supposed to move to the white markers to prevent fans from running onto the field,
- the number of personnel required included 100 ushers, four walking patrols (two officers in each patrol), and 17 portal guards in the north



and east stands (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1988).

The second source of guidance came from game day crowd tactics (Table 3) that were unique for each event. For the Michigan game, the crowd tactics stated that the primary goal for the day was to "Prevent injury to people – officers, band members, and fans." (Post-Game Crowd Tactics: Wisconsin v. Madison, 1993).

TABLE 3

*Post Game Crowd Tactics*

Our goal today is to prevent injury to people—officers, bar members and fans. A secondary goal is to protect property if that can be done without creating situations that could lead to injuries.

We expect that if Wisconsin wins today, especially if it is a close game, there will be an attempt by fans to come onto the field.

Our strategy will be to ring the inside of the fence with police officers and PerMar security personnel. Our job will be to discourage fans from coming onto the field.

PerMar people will be standing closest to the fence and will be backed by police officers. PerMar will only make passive effort to discourage fence jumping. Police officers will make effort to keep people from getting past and onto the field, but if someone breaks through and runs onto the field that should result in immediate arrest. If large numbers of people begin to push through, the officers should step aside and fall back to their goalpost assignments.

If we pull back to the goalposts, the same strategy will be used. Our purpose is to discourage people from getting onto the goalposts, but if the crown surge is great, the officers will move away from the goalposts and take up positions at the edge of the crowd.

At that point the officers should stay alert for any injuries that may occur or for any violations of the law that are likely to cause injury. Paramedics will be stationed at the fence to treat any injured persons.

COMMUNICATIONS

Crown and band noise make radio communications difficult during the 5<sup>th</sup> Quarter. If there is a crowd surge, officers at that point will make



the initial decision to move aside and begin pulling back to the goalpost assignment. Lt. Johnson will be observing from the press box and will make decisions on giving the command for all officers to pull back. That command is "Code 1000". This will be the code for pulling back from the fence and also, if necessary pulling back from the goalposts.

### ASSIGNMENTS

Areas 2 and 3 south endzone.

Area 1, 4, 5, 6, north endzone.

All officers will have post game assignments. Those with field assignments will report to their supervisors on the field with 5 minutes remaining in the game. Supervisors will assign people so as to distribute them along the fence as necessary.

Those with student section assignments will remain at the top rim of the stadium for the purpose of preventing objects from being thrown over the edge. These officers will be designated by their supervisors at pregame briefing.

### THE FENCE

There may be times during and after the game when people crowd the fence and put pressure against it. Actively encourage them to move back. If it seems there is danger of the fence breaking (it has in the past) move back to a safe position.

### GOALPOSTS

The goalposts are of a new design that is difficult to break. They will support the weight of approximately 50 people. Other stadiums have had good results from this design. They are very heavy. If they should break I am sure all officers will have chosen the proper place to be.

The University of Wisconsin's 1988 Game/Event Management Guide provided the following excerpts that specifically describe procedures that security was supposed to adhere to in regards to crowd management during the game:

- Ushers shall be stationed in sections where they can best control the flow of spectators.
- At no time shall spectators be permitted to sit in the aisle-ways.

- All aisles must be kept clear during game time and no one is permitted to loiter or stand in them. [Security must] remain in the aisle, but do not obstruct view of patrons.
- Fans shall not harass the players while they enter or leave the playing field. They [security] shall keep these areas clear during the entire game (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1988, pgs. 13 & 22)

Similar to other Big Ten schools, the University of Wisconsin outsourced its game day security efforts. Several companies such as Staff Pro and Contemporary Services Corporation provide ushers and security guards across the country. Per Mar Security Services provided security personnel for UW. Per Mar had been working with UW since 1985. As part of the Per Mar contract, the firm was responsible for supplying 175-250 employees for football games.

There were an estimated 200 Per Mar security personnel at the Michigan game. The company was also accountable for ensuring that each employee was trained and educated on the UW crowd management procedures (University of Wisconsin, Purchasing Services, 1991).

Some sources indicate that there were 65 police officers at the game, but the Football Assignment sheet showed that under police officer, Captain Hartwig, there were nine supervisors, four officers in a command booth, 67 officers at various posts, five vehicular patrol squads, five squads, and a mounted patrol officer (Football Assignments, 1993). The report also showed that there were 10 officers in area 5 (sections N-K) and eight officers in area 6 (section S-O), which comprised the student sections. Since the assignments were completed several days before the game there could have been a number of changes and absences that could affect the final number of police officers at the game.


Per Mar employees were also supplied with uniforms that would allow them to be easily recognizable. However, the game's video footage shows security in dark blue jackets, which made them hard to see in the crowd (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993). Per Mar's official, Gene Hoth, indicated that the security company knew about fan migration to the student section, since this occurred at every game. However, his company could not effectively remove such migrators because it would require his staff to check every student's ticket in 70 rows (Seely, 1993). While fan migration was a known concern, it was not part of Per Mar's training requirements (Newbart, 1993).

In the 1980s spectators were searched for contraband such as alcohol, but Per Mar was asked to only perform visual inspections at that time. While alcohol related concerns always can impact a crowd, the small number of beer and alcohol cans/bottles in the stands after the game indicated that drinking in the stadium was not a big contributor to the tragedy. Alcoholic beverages were not sold in the stadium during UW games.

The University intended for the Per Mar security to be the first line of relation with the students and that is why it was decided that the police would stay on the field and not go into the student section unless absolutely necessary. Per Mar was supposed to be the first ring of security around the field (Smith, 1993). While the police met before the event, Per Mar claimed that there was no pre-game meeting with their employees and that there were no specific instructions given to them before the Michigan game (Fried conversation, 1997). Before the season started Per Mar had a meeting with security personnel (especially with field access gate monitors that were new in 1993) (see Diagram 1), and supervisors often relayed security concerns to front line personnel (*Hagen v. Williams, consolidated case*: Deposition of B. Templeton, 1996). Another Per Mar employee indicated that pre-game meetings were not mandatory for senior personnel and that gate attendants were really not responsible for monitoring the crowd (*Hagen v. Williams, consolidated case*: Deposition of M. Damon, 1996). The University claimed that security meetings were held on Wednesdays before a game (Press Conference, 1993). A post-game security meeting was also held (Press Conference). Captain Hartwig met with police officers and other officials on October 29th to discuss strategies. One strategy was to secure a row, such as row 70 in section M,N,O,P,Q, and R for use by security personnel. Another strategy was to close exit Q, Section 19 to the public and for fans to use L-P (sections 15-17).

## DIAGRAM 1

Diagram of Stadium for Michigan Game



Besides putting game day plans into place, UW had to deal with external variables that impacted game day preparations. On October 27, an advertisement in the university paper (Diagram 2), the Badger Herald, portrayed a question and answer for students planning to attend the game on Saturday. The advertisement said, "Q: What will 75,000 Badger fans do that Michigan's Heisman Trophy Candidate Tyrone Wheatley won't? A: Rush the Field Saturday Afternoon" (1993).



## DIAGRAM 2

Newspaper Advertisement for Game Day

**Q: WHAT WILL 75,000  
BADGER FANS DO THAT  
MICHIGAN'S HEISMAN  
TROPHY CANDIDATE  
TYRONE WHEATLEY  
WON'T?**

**W VS M**

**A: RUSH THE FIELD  
SATURDAY AFTERNOON.**

**READ THE BADGER HERALD FRIDAY EDITION  
FOR A FULL PREVIEW OF WEREWOLVES AND WOLVERINES.**

This announcement gave notice to security and University officials that there could be a potential problem. The Dean of Students, Football Coach,

University Police Chief, and the University Director of Health Services responded by sending a letter to students expressing their campus security concerns for the upcoming Halloween weekend (Letter urged caution, 1993). The administrators' letter mentioned their concern for the planned field rush, but focused ways to ensure safety on campus. An October 27th, 1993 Press Release specifically mentioned that the track access would be blocked between sections M-Q before the game started. Television reports also discouraged rushing the field. In addition there was a bulletin released by Sue Riseling, Chief of Police at UW, informing students to come early to ensure seeing the kick-off, as well as entering the stadium at the designated gate of their ticket to help minimize congestion (Rouse, et. al, 1993). Neither the letters nor the television reports seemed to persuade students to refrain from rushing the field.

A negligence theory is often rooted under the framework of foreseeability. A duty to provide proper safety measures is normally found when a risk is foreseeable, and the facility manager is in the best position to prevent or eliminate the hazard (Fried, 1999). Due to foreseeability of a fan rush, based on the newspaper advertisement, past experience, game significance, and other concerns, UW needed to proactively plan appropriate procedures to handle foreseeable problems. The tactics highlighted above required Per Mar to make a passive effort to discourage fence jumping. Police officers were supposed to keep fans from getting onto the field, but if there was a crowd surge the officers were to move aside and fall back to their goalpost assignments. The goal post protection effort was called "Code 1000" and when the code was called the officers were supposed to fall back to the goals (Post game tactics, 1993).

This plan expected that the crowd flow would easily move from the stands onto the field, but it did not take into account what would transpire when a large group of people became pinned into a small area. Furthermore, the fence that was used to keep the fans from coming onto the field could not be opened if pressure was exerted on it from the spectators. The post-game tactics failed to instruct security on how to handle a large variety of situations that could occur. Numerous events transpired at the same time to make the directive ineffective and some of the concerns could not have been appreciated before the game. For example, the gates were latched to allow Michigan players to return to their locker room. If the surge occurred after the game had ended and the Michigan players were safely in their locker rooms then there would not have been a penned effect. However, the surge occurred when the game was still ongoing and there was not enough time to release the fence before it broke open.



## GAME DAY ACTIONS

The expected crowd for the game was 75,000 total spectators comprised of parents, students, alumni, staff, and residents (Telander, 1993). The weather for the event was cold and dry based upon the type of clothing that the patrons were wearing, such as heavy coats and hats. There was no mention of any weather related concerns in any depositions that would warrant any weather related crowd concerns. The importance of the game was extremely high, with rival schools competing for the Big Ten Championship, and a ticket to The Rose Bowl. The magnitude of this game combined with the festive Halloween weekend and potential for fan intoxication posed a threat to spectators and security personnel (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993).

Wisconsin game day procedures provide that the gates were to be opened one and one half hours prior to the start of the event (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1988). Once the gates were opened students rushed in to get the best available seats, and by 10:30 AM the student section was completely filled (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993). The seating capacity in the student section was 12,500 and there were 11,860 student passes issued for the game. An additional 400 seats were reserved in the student section for the band members and 227 random seats were killed meaning that the seats were left vacant. Even though there was more room than the number of expected fans in that section, it is estimated that an additional 800-2,000 fans had migrated to the student section, and these fans helped fill the aisles. It was also suspected that students would enter and then hand there passes to students who would exit the facility and give the passes to more students. The police attempted to clear the aisles during the game, but were not successful (Glinski, 1994).

By the game's beginning, the student section and adjacent sections were filled beyond capacity; however, due to a lack of video footage of other sections of the stadium it is difficult to determine from where fans were migrating. It was noticeable early in the game that security and ushers were not keeping aisles clear and preventing fan migration. The game video also showed that ushers and security were not present in the aisles and had lost control over the crowd's behavior in those areas (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993). As stated earlier, UW standard operating procedures required all aisles to be kept clear during the game (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1988). While the aisles might have been a concern, the video also showed that

the thrust of student movement was not in the aisles, but was due to students stepping over bleachers. The disappearance of the ushers implies that either a lack of training or poor adherence to stated procedures was apparent. Records showed the students' section had only 19 scheduled security guards for all 12,500 fans, which is a 1 to 658 ratio (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics). It is important to note that the crowd management "standard" of one trained crowd manager for every 250 patrons was established prior to 1993 by the National Fire Protection Agency (IAAM, 2002).

Case Logs showed 20 arrests or incidents during the game including eight arrests for ticket scalping and three arrests for conveyance (carrying alcohol bottles). One fan was arrested for disorderly conduct and one fan complained about being hit in the head with a beer bottle. However, the arrest and incident numbers for the game were not significantly different compared to arrest records from prior years and from prior games in the 1993 season (Command Post Log, 1993a & 1993b).

There was also a problem with fans throwing objects. The University staff had known about this problem from previous games that same year. In response to this concern, the University's Chancellor asked the student body to throw marshmallows, however, what he did not realize was that he was condoning the action, which was a blatant procedure violation. It was later found that spectators had stuffed pennies, batteries, and anything with weight into the marshmallows before they were thrown (Mueller, 1993). The video shows specific patrons throwing marshmallows and other objects at the visiting team as they left the field, but security did not stop such activity (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993). When security did not stop violations, such as throwing objects or seating violations, fans could perceive that such actions were acceptable. This was evident from video that showed fans throwing rolls of toilet paper, inflatable advertising materials, and anything else they could get their hands on.

In the third quarter the crowd became more energized from the tightly fought game. Video shows mascots, cheerleaders, the University band, as well as television cameras adding a peak in the excitement level of the crowd (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993). Fans wishing to appear on television were clamoring to get into the picture and were leaning over other fans to get in front of the camera. At that point, no aisles could be seen, portals were filled with standing spectators, and there was no visible presence of security within the student sections. This would have been the proper time to disperse the crowd and clear aisles in



anticipation of possible problems, but security seemed to be congregating only on the field level in an effort to divert the crowd from rushing the field. It is evident from video that the problem did not start on the field, but rather at the top of the stands, where security was not present (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics). Even though the video did not show security in the top row, the university wanted to use the top row for security personnel. The university's procedure manual indicates that in sections M, N, O, P, Q, and R that "Row 70 will be used for Security" in order to help manage the crowd (University of Wisconsin-Madison Division of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1988).

As the game approached its finish and the University of Wisconsin was heading towards victory, the crowd began chanting "Rush The Field!" With 2:00 left on the game clock, the beginning of a crowd surge can be observed moving down towards the field. Per Mar and police personnel were seen on the field attempting to keep fans in the stands. Even with fans leaning against the fence, security and the police attempted to keep fans moving. The combination of the force of the fans funneling downwards and the security trying to hold their position resulted in the fans at the bottom being pinned up against the fence. Security personnel tried to open the gates to the field, which were closed to allow the Michigan players to enter their locker room, but the pressure of the bodies prevented the gates from opening (Glinski, 1994). As the pressure grew, the fence on the field level gave way, causing a domino effect with fans falling on top of each other. According to the previously mentioned post-game crowd tactics, the fence had a history of breaking from the pressure exerted by the crowd. Since there was a past history of fence related problems, it was foreseeable that if pressure was exerted on the fence it would malfunction or break. This implies a major problem in the pre-game planning for such occurrences.

"Code 1000," which meant all officers pull back, was called out by the PA system, but security personnel continued to pin spectators in the stands. Several Per Mar security officials indicated they did not know what "Code 1000" meant (Post-Game Tactics, 1993). Medically untrained fans were administering to injured fans due to the fact that security had retreated to the field too early. Untrained fans were also attempting to control the crowd, which caused additional problems.

Some of the facts raised in the police reports prepared after the game included:

One officer retrieved ten whippet tanks which are 2 ½ inch steel canisters used to store nitrous oxide and which when empty were thrown at officers,

Halls and restrooms were overflowing with fans from sections M-R, Per Mar was not in front of the officers in certain areas (northeast side, Section P),

A number of doctors in the stands came to help the injured,

One officer only saw six (6) Per Mar security personnel between section O-P and the officer asked the Per Mar supervisor to bring more people and the supervisor indicated he was trying to get security over to the student section.

One officer felt the ESPN camera crew encouraged the students to jump on the fence and that UW football players were trying to slap hands with students, which drew the students even closer to the field (*Read v. Riseling*, 1995).

These various activities can be observed on the game video tape taken by University officials and highlighted in the event timeline contained in Table 4.

TABLE 4\*

*Game Timeline (from game video tape)*

<u>Time</u>	<u>Comments</u>
10:30a.m.	One hour before kickoff student section appears full
12:51p.m.	Aisles in section P are still visible and Section P-Q is just as crowded as N-O
12:54p.m.	Section O-P packed and students throwing marshmallows
12:55p.m.	Students in costumes seen celebrating touchdown with throwing beach balls and toilet paper
12:57p.m.	Student pointing at field shouting "rush the field"
1:00p.m.	Everything looked fine at the field level
1:02p.m.	Michigan players start returning to locker room for half time
1:04p.m.	Band playing during half time
1:24p.m.	Side screens removed to protect Michigan players returning to the field
1:36p.m.	Students in Section P-Q can still get through aisles to portals
1:39p.m.	View of aisles in Section R-S clear
2:00p.m.	Fans seen climbing up and down side of vomitory entrance
2:02p.m.	Commotion in stands when students try to impress cameraman
2:05p.m.	Police are seen on the field. The fence and padding are visible and fans are moving freely in the area between the stands and fence
2:08p.m.	Band members start moving towards field
2:12p.m.	Fans are moving freely between fence and first row
2:17p.m.	Body passing in Section P
2:26p.m.	14 minutes before game ends aisles in student section starting to fill

- 2:29p.m. Students chanting to "rush the field"
- 2:31p.m. Camera shows ecstatic fans
- 2:32p.m. Per Mar security seen freely opening and closing gate to allow people through
- 2:36p.m. Fans start crowding around fence
- 2:37p.m. Fans start descending down the bleachers
- 2:38p.m. Police start forming ring around field and band starts moving to field
- 2:39p.m. Badger mascot and cameraman by students encouraging them. No movement seen
- 2:40:50p.m. Fans from upper row start pushing with force and fans in Sections P-Q are being pushed against red safety railing. Students counting down final seconds on clock and yelling "rush the field," and "storm the field."
- 2:40:52p.m. Red safety railing in Section Q collapses
- 2:41:05p.m. With 6 seconds remaining the UW takes a knee to end the game
- 2:41:11p.m. Gates closed as Michigan players start exiting the field
- 2:41:50p.m. The top of the students section is almost completely empty as fans descend
- 2:42:26p.m. Chain link-fence comes down in Section O.
- 2:42:50p.m. Additional fencing collapses and students stream across the trampled for another 50 seconds before they realize that people are being trampled.

\*(Fried, 2004b)

### POST-GAME ACTIONS

Newspapers reported that 70 fans had injuries that required hospital treatment, and 4 were serious enough to require extended hospitalization (Dorsher, 1993). While in the hospital, the University dispatched counseling center staff to three area emergency rooms and created a Hot Line to provide accurate information to victims/family members (Dorsher). From reviewing the security video of the post-game aftermath it was observed that as the crowd surged onto the field the Emergency Response Vehicles (located in the south corners of the stadium) were unable to drive the 100+ yards to the north end of the facility where injured patrons were located due to fan congestion on the field. Some security was seen pushing fans back into the stands, others were observed pulling spectators onto the field, and some were standing around watching the crisis unfold. Additionally, the PA announcer could be heard instructing people to disperse, however, it was obvious that the people on the field either could not hear what was being said or were so caught up in the moment that they chose to ignore the message. Throughout this tragedy the band was still positioned beyond the north end zone and some members played despite the melee that was occurring. Fans also congregated around the goalposts attempting to tear them down.



Five hours after the incident occurred, the University's police established a Command Post that served as a communication center for all phone inquiries and media contact. Review of the Command Post's log showed that an assortment of callers provided the following information: a security guard was sitting and watching the game, security did not know policies, students did not hear the warnings, security did not seem to know what "code 1000" meant, and suggestions on how to alleviate further problems. The Command Post was in operation until November 4, 1993 (Command Post Log, 1993a).

Police records also show an interesting trend in regard to ticket sales and scalping in conjunction with UW home football games. University documents regarding the total number of tickets available for sale show that the game was undersold (Big Ten Conference, 1993a). A review of all police reports on home football games from the 1991, 1992, and 1993 seasons show a total of 15 instances of documented ticket scalping (University of Wisconsin Police Department, 1991-1993). Ten of these occurrences were during the Michigan game, which means that either more tickets were available for this game or an increased number of police officers were on duty outside of the stadium. Additionally, individuals that worked the concession areas of Camp Randall were each given 5 free tickets to the football game, and the bearer of the ticket was allowed to sit in any area of the stadium that was not occupied by another spectator, but most fans wanted to sit in the student section based upon the activity there (Command Post Log, 1993b).

The University undertook to minimize the trauma to students and provided post event trauma counseling to spectators and to the injured in three local emergency rooms (Press conference, 1993). The University's officials also took immediate action in response to the tragedy to better prepare Camp Randall Stadium for the following week's football game against The Ohio State University. This was also a game that held implications for a Rose Bowl appearance and a possible National Championship. The following represents a list of changes that were instituted:

#### Student Section

- Students had to exchange their student passes for paper tickets and hand-stamps
- The band was moved out of the seating area and took a permanent position on the field increasing the student section by an additional 400 seats (Brinkman, 1993).

### Security

- Increased the number of security personnel in the student sections
- Personnel were to patrol aisles and keep people from standing, sitting, or watching from those areas
- Control fan migration from other areas of the stadium into the student section
- Introduced "Safety Inspectors" who roamed the stadium and kept a watchful eye of the other security personnel (Brinkman, 1993).

### Policies


- A media campaign was introduced throughout the entire week to encourage fans to display proper and safe behaviors
- Have UW players enter and exit only through the tunnel in Sections L-M rather than allowing them to exit in Sections P-Q in the heart of the student section
- Television cameras were banned from entering or filming the student section (Brinkman, 1993).

### Facility

- Increased the number of speakers within the student section
- The visiting team's exit was covered with a canopy in order to protect the exiting team
- 5 more gates with fixed release exits were constructed to allow for potential crowd surges to be released quicker and were installed between sections M-P (See Diagram 3)
- The low steel chain-link fence was redesigned to avoid trapping fans (Brinkman, 1993).

DIAGRAM 3

Stadium Diagram for Ohio State Game, 1993



A review of the video footage from the football game on November 6, 1993 against The Ohio State University showed that many of these changes were indeed put into effect. Security was seen patrolling aisles and instructing fans who were standing in them to move to their seating areas. Aisles within the student section were visible and the portals were not congested (Game Day Video, 1993). It should be noted that the game was played at a later start time with snow flurries, which could have possibly fostered tired and cold fans. While Wisconsin fans are accustomed to cold weather, fans in any region can get cold if they have to wait around or do not move. Factors such as these combined with the shock of what had occurred during the prior week's game led to a crowd whose energy was quite subdued.



## LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CASE

As would be expected from any major injury case, litigation followed the healing process. After the incident, 51 Notice of Claims were filed. In addition 18 injured parties filed 15 different lawsuits against the State, University, personnel, and the security company (Balousek, 1996). One of the plaintiffs, Adam Read, claimed in his complaint that a jury would find UW employees and security staff negligent for several reasons including:

- Failure of security to follow UW security rules and procedures, which prohibited students from sitting in the aisles.
- Allowing numerous students and fans in the student section that did not have tickets for that section.
- Having inadequate staff and planning for the occurrence of a UW victory, which would likely cause the students to go onto the field (*Read v. Riseling*, 1995).

No matter what the theory(ies), the actions against the State were dismissed by several courts and supported by a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. The court dropped all claims against the state defendants on the grounds of sovereign and discretionary immunity. As the defendants' argued, "Since Defendant University of Wisconsin-Madison is an agency of the State, the claims and cross claims alleged against it are barred by sovereign immunity" (*Hagen v. Williams, consolidated cases*: Brief of Defendants, 1996). The Dane County Circuit Court judge dismissed the suit by indicating that the acts of the athletic department and police department for the University were in performance of government functions and they used their discretion as to how to deal with the possible danger posed by a potential crowd rush (*Eneman et al. v. Richter et al*, 1998). Thus, the university based defendants were able to exit the case based on sovereign immunity.

Sovereign immunity is designed to protect the state and its agencies. In Wisconsin, this protection is derived from the Wisconsin Constitution, art. IV, Section 27 (*Hagen v. Williams, consolidated cases*: Brief of Defendants, 1996). The University claimed that it was a state agency/board and as such all actions against it were actions against the state, not an independent going concern, and thus barred by sovereign immunity (*Hagen*, 1996).

Plaintiffs also claimed the University violated the State's safe place statute. The Plaintiff's argued that the Wisconsin State Legislature implemented this law with a purpose of going above the common-law "reasonably safe place" statute by adding the condition as safe as the nature of the place will reasonably permit (*Hagen v. Williams, consolidated cases*: Brief of

Defendants, 1996). Based on a prior injury case at Camp Randall, the Wisconsin courts have concluded that:

this does not apply to the State nor is there language used in the statute, which indicates any intention on the part of legislature to change the rule with respect to liability of the State for the acts of its officers and agents (*Hagen*, p. 6).

Thus, the defendants, who were agents/officers of the State institution, were protected because the safe place statute does not pertain to State facilities, such as Camp Randall Memorial Stadium.

"A public officer is not personally liable to one injured as a result of an act performed within the scope of his/her official authority and in the line of his official duty" (*Hagen v. Williams, consolidated cases*: Brief of Defendants, 1996, p. 8). Since the defendants could all be considered public employees, they are entitled to discretionary immunity. In affidavits signed by all of the defendants it was stated that, "I never had responsibility for the performance of any specific task pertaining to controlling the behavior of spectators at UW-Madison football games" (Affidavit of David Ward, 1996).

The defendants (University officials) submitted affidavits indicating that in addition to not being responsible for any specific tasks, they were also not responsible for trying to control the actions of fans coming onto the playing field during or after the game. Even knowing before the game that students were likely to attempt going on to the field, this was not enough to file suit. Controlling the behavior of the crowd fell on the shoulders of Per Mar. If this company had not been hired and UW-Madison had been responsible for security, the claims would have been harder to dismiss.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EVENTS

In the months after the incident, Chancellor Ward requested a review of Camp Randall Stadium. The consultants' report recommended 49 changes to improve fan safety and it was estimated that the recommended changes would cost approximately \$300,000 and eliminate 303 seats (Kaiser & Hyer, 1994). Some of the most significant points through the recommendation were:

- Student Seating and Ticketing Changes: student ticketing should be changed to reduce the chance of overcrowding and make enforcement of stadium rules on behavior easier.
- Stadium Facility Improvements: facility improvements will assist in keeping the north end zone aisle open and reinforce the fact the field is for the Team and the Band and cannot be reached by "rushing."

- Changing Stadium Traditions: an initial and ongoing effort to encourage appropriate fan behavior will most likely prevent future crowd surges and, hopefully, change behavior and traditions.
- Stadium Crowd and Safety Management: additional resources and more sophisticated management techniques are required to manage sell-out capacity crowds, which are the result of rapid attendance growth over a short period of time.
- Management of Stadium Capacity through Increased Ticket Controls: the Athletic Department should give higher priority to creating a comprehensive internal ticket and cash control system and complete the implementation of controls as quickly as possible. (Kaiser & Hyer, 1994)

These five recommendations were the major points, and within each of these five areas there were additional recommendations. Some recommendations developed after the review of all documents from this case study were:

- An emergency plan must be established, implemented, and executable. In this plan, an emergency response management team should be established and all worst case scenarios should be considered.
- A predetermined PA announcement should have been made in case of an emergency. That way there was a clear and established procedure that could have been followed.
- Tickets purchased with student ID's should be limited to one ticket per ID, and there is no replacing lost tickets unless a new ticket is purchased for the general price.
- Band, cheerleaders, mascot, and television media should be placed throughout the stadium and not all located in one section. This is to prevent fans from migrating into one area within the confines of the stadium. Also, the 5<sup>th</sup> quarter could be moved to outside the stadium into the parking lot.
- Security Personnel for security companies should be paid more, since at \$6.76 per hour and \$7.26 per hour for security Personnel Supervisors, it is hard to hire the best trained people.
- During events, security and Per Mar personnel should be easily identifiable, with distinct clothing (ex: bright yellow or orange uniforms)



- With establishing a command center within the stadium, the police should make better use video cameras to coordinate security and to help enforce rules throughout the stadium.
- The distribution of radios within each section between Per Mar officials should be increased. Per Mar officials should be in direct communication at all time and not rely on messages past on by word of mouth.
- Even though there was a pre-game meeting of event personnel, it should be mandatory for ALL personnel to attend. This will help to relay information that might be important to a particular game or situation. These meetings might also include some type of training. The administration needs to plan each game differently based on the importance of the game, events that might have occurred during the week prior to the game, or upcoming events.
- For future events, the University should look into increasing security and crowd managers. Prior to 1993, the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) established a standard that one trained crowd manager must be present for every 250 patrons when the seating occupancy for the facility was greater than 250 (IAAM, 2002). The University of Wisconsin had 1 crowd manager to every 658 spectators, and it is highly questionable as to the extent of training that those managers had been through.
- Also, to prevent fan migration and over crowding in certain section within the stadium, they should eliminate general admission seating. Having reserved seating will only help decrease the flow of fans to different areas. The possibility of spreading the student section through out the stadium instead of having it located in one section might also be looked into, as it has with other Big Ten schools.

In 1994 the University petitioned to and was awarded a variance to modify the stadium and officially obtain approval for the 17" seats. The variance was being requested to allow a higher number of seats between any seat and aisles (from 30.5 seats to 32 seats), to install a physical barrier in front of sections J-O, allow the 17" numbers to be used when repainting seat numbers on the new aluminum bleachers being installed, and to prevent the loss of 3,570 seats if the stadium reverted back to 18 inches per seat rather than 17 inches (Murray, 1994). The variance also specifically provided as follows:

- 1) At least sixty days prior to each football season the UW Athletic Department shall submit a crowd management plan to the Madison

Fire Department for approval. The crowd management plan shall include provisions for:

- a) maintaining the capacities throughout the stadium and in each section,
- b) maintenance of exit aisles and other means of egress,
- c) crowd control,
- d) other measures as deemed necessary to ensure compliance and prevent injuries

2) At least 30 days prior to each Stadium event with an anticipated capacity of at least 50,000 or when chairs or bleachers are placed on the field the UW Athletic Department shall submit a seating, exiting, and crowd control plan to the Madison Fire Department for approval. (Fire Department Position Statement, 1994).

The safety measures undertaken subsequent to the Michigan game appear to be effective. There has not been any similar incidents that posed a threat similar to the crowd rush of 1993. However, while the lesson learned in Wisconsin appear to have made a lasting impact; other stadiums have not been as lucky.

### SUBSEQUENT TROUBLES AT OTHER STADIUMS

The University of Wisconsin is not alone in making changes and trying to address crowd related concerns that could lead to significant injuries. While it would be assumed that the lessons learned from Camp Randall and other incidents would have resulted in reduced occurrence of tragedies - that has not been the case. Numerous incidents from the tragedy in a Rhode Island nightclub that killed over 100 patrons to numerous post-game/championship riots that cause significant injury and property damage (Fried, 2004a).

For example, West Virginia has had a number of violent post-football game celebrations. Contemporary Service Corporation (CSC) a large security provider employs approximately 240 people to work the games with 150 working security. The Morgantown, WV Police Department sends between 15-20 officers and around 30 University Police officers also work the games (Parr, 1999). One officer with the University Police felt that 90% of the problems are associated with alcohol. Other major factors include whether the team had a winning season, and the opponent being played (Parr).

In 1998 West Virginia Mountaineer fans showered the field with golf balls and whiskey bottles. In 1996 an airborne trash can hit a Miami (FL) coach in

the head (Wieberg & Carey, 2003). The biggest problem has been fires as fans have set 900 fires outside the stadium since 1997. University officials were cautious because in the prior month there had been a number of incidents where fans stormed the fields and tore-down the goal posts, and several fans were injured when the goal-posts came down at a game against Toledo. Thus, police and University officials warned students for weeks that unacceptable conduct would not be tolerated. However, after their October 22, 2003, victory against nationally ranked Virginia Tech, thousands of students took to the streets and set about 100 fires. Fans were also doused with pepper spray after they attempted to storm the field and tear down the goal posts (Carey, 2003). The fires were smaller than in the past, due to the city workers making extra trips to remove combustible garbage such as couches. Three weeks earlier three students were disciplined and one student was expelled after similar activity occurred after a close loss to Miami. In response, city officials planned for the Virginia Tech game through arming city employees with video cameras to take pictures of students engaging in law-breaking activities (Carey).

#### DEALING WITH FAN MISCONDUCT

Options to deal with fan misconduct are numerous, but often hard to predict. A coach providing a warning during a game could prevent some misconduct, but what about after a game. At that point it is too late to call a penalty. Some administrators are advocating calling the playing field off limits and instituting harsh penalties, such as the opposing team getting the ball on the 50-yard line at the beginning of the next game as a way to penalize a home team that has a crowd rush (Wieberg & Carey, 2004). Such recommendations are in addition to educational efforts such as public service announcements (PSAs), e-mails from star players, undercover liquor control agents, appeals for parental support, partnering with property managers to notify officials of large parties, working with the Greek community, instituting parking bans, emptying city trash cans before, during and immediately after an event, hosting a post game concert that could be cancelled if fans misbehave, suspending students, and using a university web site to identify students (NCAA, 2003a; Wieberg & Carey, 2004). West Virginia's biggest rival, Virginia Tech, developed a sportsmanship program called "Hokies Respect" designed to promote "first-class fan conduct at all Virginia Tech sporting events." (NCAA, 2003b).

New strategies were also developed at a summit in Dallas, Texas, in conjunction with the 2003 National Association of Collegiate Directors of



Athletics (NACDA) conference. A 16 page report was produced suggesting changes to institutional game management, community relations, student behavior/alcohol abuse, coach/player behavior, and media oversight.

Before games the schedule should be examined to determine which events represent the most likely concerns. Start time also should be examined since rowdier behavior often occurs at night games after the crowds have a chance to drink throughout the day. During the game, strategies could include disbursing students throughout the stadium rather than in sections, sitting students in areas where it is very difficult to reach the field, banning instant replays that might incite a crowd, having all security personnel carry around pocket-sized game management handbooks, and using police officers to garner more respect. Preparing for the post game activities could include developing goal post shaped as an "H" which are more difficult to bring down and goal posts that can be taken down to the ground seconds after a game ends (NCAA, 2003a).

Campus and community relation strategies can include working with legislators to increase penalties for illegal conduct, increasing penalties in student codes of conduct, and working with local bars to ban sales such as \$1 pitchers of beer. To work on alcohol related concerns, institutions can vigorously enforce open container laws, establish alcohol free tailgate areas, offer student organizations willing to abide by certain rules of conduct preferential seating, let fans know they are going to be videotaped, and tell fans that they can lose their season tickets for poor behavior (NCAA, 2003a). The coaches, players, and the media can also impact fan behavior. As seen from the Camp Randall tragedy, when players, mascots, the band, and the broadcasters entice the fans into a ruckus, they can be part of the problem. That does not mean that students and athletes cannot act in a valiant effort as seen by the efforts of numerous heroes who jumped in to save others during the Camp Randall incident.

In light of the Summit findings, various conferences adopted supplemental sportsmanship rules that can also improve fan behavior. For instance, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) developed rules such as:

- there needs to be a five yard buffer zone between teams,
- visiting teams will not be allowed "curtain calls" by coming back onto the field to celebrate,
- visiting bands will only be allowed 2-3 post-game songs before being required to leave,
- noisemakers such as cow bells and fog horns will be banned,

fake fights and wrestling matches between mascots are banned, cheerleaders from opposing teams are prohibited from contacting one another, and home teams will be barred from playing partisan noise at opposing teams (Bloom, 2003).

### CONCLUSION

There is no one correct method to make a sport facility safe. Numerous different events can occur that can help change an event or a facility in seconds. From terrorist attacks to natural disasters, a facility manager needs to be constantly aware of various concerns that can impact the event/facility. This case study has highlighted some of the numerous concerns that helped create an environment where a crowd rush could occur and injure patrons. By analyzing what were the key points and facts associated with the incident, it is hoped that students can understand how both minor and larger concerns can help lead to a tragedy. Furthermore, by analyzing the facts and time-lines, students should be able to better appreciate the concerns faced on a daily basis by those trying to hold large events.

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